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This research questions whether there is evidence that contract performance measurement 
is influenced by the social structure in which it is embedded.   I question whether the 
strong ties between a prime contractor and its subcontractors lead to higher performance 
scores in public contracting.  I also question if prior relations between a Georgia 
Department of Transportation (GDOT) manager and the private firm project manager 





Public contracting is a policy prescription designed to increase government efficiency 
and effectiveness, therefore it is reasonable that its performance is frequently discussed in 
efficiency and effectiveness terms.  Performance measurement theory, however, pushes 
to expand the discussion beyond these terms.  It seeks to capture the influence of all key 
factors that shape performance measurement, whether obvious or obscured.  Herein lies 
the debatable proposition.  There are claims that key influences, factors that determine if 
public contracting will be deemed successful, go unexamined. There are claims that the 
language, concepts and theory of transaction cost are not capable of fully explaining how 
performance scores for public contracting are determined. In this research I evaluate  
claims that transaction cost economics theory, with its focus on efficiency and 
effectiveness measures, omits or undervalues the influence social factors have on 
performance scores. 
 
In particular, this research questions whether there is evidence that contract performance 
measurement is influenced by the social structure in which it is embedded.   I question 
whether the strong ties between a prime contractor and its subcontractors lead to higher 
performance scores in public contracting.  I also question if prior relations between a 
Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) manager and the private firm project 
manager whose work is being evaluated lead to higher performance scores. 
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There are a number of theoretical approaches that could be used in questioning the impact 
social relations has on performance measurement in public contracting.  The question 
could be explored through propositions from governance, network structure, relational 
contracting or principle-agent theories. I choose, however, to approach the questions 
using performance measurement, transaction cost economics and embeddedness theories, 
combined with a bit of influence from network structure theory.  I use performance 
measurement theory to establish the necessity of measuring all factors that play a 
significant role in determining where an organization is successfully moving toward goal 
attainment.  Transaction cost economics is used to explain widely accepted practice in 
public contracting and embeddedness theory defines how the social structure exerts 
influence on performance scores and why this influence should not be ignored. 
 
My work should tell us if transaction cost economics is correct in not accounting for 
social relations in contracting performance measurement, or if embeddedness theory is 
correct in accounting for them.  I will do this by taking a closer look at the impact tie 
strength between prime contractors and their subcontractors has on performance scores 
and by observing the impact social relations between GDOT and its contractors has on 
performance scores. Then, I will be able to comment on how social relations fit into 
public contracting performance measurement theory. 
 
I undertake this objective aware of Heinreich’s caution that the stage has been set for 
inevitable measurement problems, when an inherently political process is superimposed 






Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of the study rests in its ability to identify if social relations play a role in 
improving and measuring government efficiency and effectiveness.  Of specific interest 
to public administrators and policy scholars is understanding whether the relationship 
between prime contractors and subcontractors influence the performance scoring on 
public contracts.  With this information, public managers can determine if these relations 
provide an avenue for improving performance. 
 
Policy researchers and public managers are also interested in understanding how social 
relations might impact performance measurement. The influence of these relations is 
particularly important when the nature of the work performed cannot be evaluated by 
metrics such as dollars saved, jobs created or clients served. Special skills are not 
required to collect, measure or report these types of metrics. In situations involving 
highly skilled human capital such as the engineering design work in this study, 
performance has to be evaluated by public managers who have similar skills as the 
private firm employees they evaluate.  Stakeholders rely on these specially skilled 
evaluators to deliver objective, unbiased and accurate descriptions of the work provided. 
This analysis will comment on whether elected officials, public administrators and 




Delimitations of Study 
 
The primary limitation of the research is its generalizability.  While propositions arising 
from this study may be causal, logical and predictive, they are not generalizable  
(Galaskiewicz 2007).  Findings are limited to explaining the relationships as they occur in 
Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT).  The social relations in this study are 
between a small group of highly skilled individuals, who are involved in professional 
engineering design services.  People employed in engineering design tend to be highly 
educated and skilled in engineering and other technical matters. As such the relationships 
they share may not be reflected in the general public. 
 
 Despite the stated limitations, the data do provide an interesting way to see what happens 
with performance measurement when specially trained individuals at GDOT work with, 
then evaluate, their similarly trained private firm peers.  
 
Definition of Terms 
 
GDOT-  Georgia Department of Transportation 
OCD  Office of Consultant Design 
 A department within the Georgia 
Department of Transportation, which is 
charged with managing engineering 
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design work for roads and highway 
projects. 
Prime Contractor or Prime Consultant  The firm that contracts directly with 
GDOT to perform engineering design 
related services.   This firm is 
ultimately responsible for delivering 
contracted services.  It also selects 
subcontractor firms that will participate 
on the project. 
Subcontractor Firm allocated a specific task by the 
prime contractor.  It does not contract 
directly with OCD. 
 
Organization of the Study 
 
The remainder of the study is organized into four chapters, bibliography and appendices 
as follows:  Chapter Two provides a review of relevant literature influencing the research.  
Chapter Three details data collection and description of the data used.  Chapter Four 
describes the model and methodology and presents results. Chapter Five reports findings, 
conclusions, implications for public policy and suggestions for future research.  The 









In the literature review, we use an inverted pyramid approach to examine how different 
thought has defined of what is critical to successful contract performance measurement. 
We first discuss some of  the basic requirements of good performance measurement. 
From there, we move to reviewing how New Institutional Economics (NIE) and 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theories have come to define which factors are 
critical to successful contracting performance (Williamson, 1985, 1998). We then 
question whether approaches such as TCE fully capture all factors that influence 
performance measurement.  We review claims that economic based thought 
undersocializes what is actually observed in economic activity.  Specifically, we review 
embeddedness theory arguments that observed performance in any economic activity is 
much more complex than groups of economic factors interacting with each other to 
produce results (Granovetter, 1985).  The goal is to understand how our thoughts  will 
change if we observe that social relations have significant impact on performance 
measurement. This in turn, will help researchers and practitioners understand  if 





Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
The importance of reliable and valid performance measurement is firmly established in 
public management literature, as is the attendant ambiguity and uncertainty about what 
should be measured and which methodology should be used for measurement.   The need 
to approach performance measurement as a part of administrative science can be traced 
back to Ridley and Simon (1938). Yet, it remains one of the big questions of public 
management, with concerns regarding how to employ ethical, objective and unbiased 
measurement to help public managers achieve organizational goals  (Behn,1995, (Adnan, 
Jamil et al. 2012).   
 
Stakeholders expect public managers to measure performance in ways that will help them 
increase achievements.  The goal of performance measurement is not only to understand 
behavior, but also to provide indicators for improving performance (Behn 1995).  These 
indicators are to produce rigorous evidence of the circumstances and environment under 
which government can be expected to deliver the desired level of performance (Heinrich 
2007; Heinrich 2012).  Performance measurements were to help citizens, public 
managers, elected officials and other stakeholders determine if a policy had made any 
difference at all or if the same level of achievement could have been obtained without the 
policy (Behn 1995).  
 
Early research in public administration called for new standards of measurements for 
municipal government.  These standards were to be practical tools, not theoretical 
concepts nor playthings for statisticians. The standards were to be based on observations 
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of real phenomena rather than hypothesized explanations of possible relationships 
(Ridley and Simon 1938). 
 
 
The standards proposed by early proponents were intended to assess the competency and 
capability of public organizations to meet objectives or goals.  The standards were to be 
practical tools, which met the practical need of choosing between alternate actions.  They 
were to provide guidance for improving performance (Ridley and Simon 1938; 
Rubenstein, Schwarfz et al. 2003).  The standards and measurements were to provide 
evidence that government is effective.  They are also intended to improve policy 
decisions (Wholey and Newcomer 1997), improve communication between citizens and 
government (Wholey and Hatry 1992), inform the budgetary process and promote 
accountability (Kravchuk and Schack 1996). The benefits of performance measurement 
can also reach beyond goal setting and influencing and evaluating delivery processes.  
Hatry extends the usefulness of performance measurement to ten different tasks 
including, responding to calls for accountability, internal budgeting, identifying 
performance problems, building public trust and contracting (Hatry 1999).  Behn 
identifies eight purposes for performance measurement: to evaluate, control, budget, 
motivate, promote, celebrate, learn and improve.  Behn then proposes that each purpose 
requires different measures (Behn 2003). This further establishes the need to design 
performance measurement to address specific information needs, rather than use a 
generic performance measurement process. 
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When appropriate standards are used in performance measurement, stakeholders will be 
able to determine what was really accomplished.  For this reason, the measurements 
should focus on outcomes rather than inputs and outputs.  Behn draws the distinction by 
pointing out that outcome is defined by the objective (Behn 1995). For example in public 
contracting, public managers could report that the number of contracts awarded to new 
firms was fifty-six.  If there was no stated goal of changing the number of new firms 
awarded contracts, then that measurement is an output rather than an outcome. On the 
other hand if a stated goal was to double the number of firms from south Georgia that 
were awarded contracts, a report on how that number changed would be a measurement 
of outcome.  There is an important difference in outputs and outcomes. This difference is 
reflected in a well-designed performance measurement process.  
 
Although inherently useful to the public decision making process, it was not until the 
1960s and 1970s that pressure to explain governmental performance ignited.  Citizens 
demanded greater accountability from public managers and public managers desired 
additional information to support better decision making  (Poister 1999).  The pressures 
of meeting citizens’ demands for lower taxes along with pressures from politicians for 
greater accountability and efficiency, repositioned performance measurement from a 
routine step in the policy process to a position of central importance.   The pressure from 
citizens and decision makers compelled public managers to not only produce 
performance measurements, but to also produce ones that were reliable and relevant.  
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In general, it is agreed that performance measurement tools are intended to help improve 
decision making and ultimately improve organizational performance, by determining if 
an action has been effective and efficient in reaching objectives. What is in question is 
the specific information that would be helpful (Neely, 1995). Performance measurement 
should be practical, but practical in what sense? As mentioned, performance 
measurement in the public sector is required to respond to the information needs of 
citizens, elected officials and public managers.  Stakeholders trust performance 
measurements as reliable purveyors of information they deem important.  How then do 
public managers choose whose information needs to address?  
 
The usefulness of information from performance measures is determined before the first 
measurement is taken because it depends on how well organizational goals and objectives 
are stated.  It also depends on how appropriate they are for the existing environment 
(Bititci, 2000, Dixon, 1990). Lack of agreement on objectives will lead to inadequate 
performance measurement.  Regardless of the methodology, it is impossible to 
meaningfully measure performance if performance is not preceded by a clear, coherent 
mission and strategy (Kravchuk and Schack 1996).  Instead of delivering worthwhile 
measurements, without clear understanding of policy objectives, performance 
measurement will default to using readily available resources, and deliver simplistic 
evaluations (Behn 2003). For example, when explaining which dimensions of 
performance are selected for measurement and analysis, some public managers state that 
the organization’s mission, goals and objectives determine selection.  Yet, only 42 
percent believe that their organization’s performance measurement system focuses on 
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what is important (Poister, 1999). Instead, many public managers believe that in the final 
analysis, they end up measuring and describing whatever the available data allows them 
to measure and describe (Poister 1999).  The realities of performance measurement 
systems is they can prevent public managers from zeroing in on areas that would deliver 
the greatest improvement in performances and offer the most impactful improvement in 
decision making (Morley 1983). This shortcoming frustrates stakeholders because 
regardless of whether they are clear in expressing their information needs, stakeholders 
want to know if the value of services rendered meet the value of services expected (Wang 
2010). 
When well conceptualized and accurately interpreted, performance measurements will 
provide the information stakeholders desire. However, it is important to note that 
determining what needs to be measured can be a complex task.  As Brown and Potoski 
state, there are services where it is difficult to measure the quality of outcomes.  When 
governments contract out such services, they run the risk of unseen vendor 
nonperformance or negligence (Brown and Potoski 2003).  There are also measurement 
issues when successful measurement from one activity is instituted as measurement for 
another.  This problem often arises in the public sector, when government agencies 
attempt to use financial ratios as measures of performance for a mission driven 
organization. This type of measurement is not appropriate for public sector organizations 
because they do not address many of the key objectives of such organizations (Behn 
2003).  If there is interest in using the measurements of efficiency and effectiveness 




Instead of relying on measurements from the private sector, public organizations should 
seek their own practical tools to meet their unique practical needs.  Along with 
addressing organizational goals and objectives, performance measurements used in the 
public sector should reflect local customs and mores.  They should reflect the knowledge 
and expert opinion of administrators, because these public managers have superior 
knowledge of and familiarity with the organization’s operations, goals and objectives 
(Ridley 1938; Poister 1999). Measurements in the public sector have little need to mimic 
those of the private sector.  Instead performance measurement in the public sector should 
measure what is important, even though that might not be immediately obvious.  If that is 
the case, administrators should determine what information is important to all important 
stakeholders.  They should abandon the search for one set of factors that will serve under 
all circumstances (Kravchuk and Schack 1996; Behn 2003). 
 
Although efficiency ratios and measurement of effectiveness may fulfill information 
needs in the private sector, they may not have the same impact in the public sector.  This 
is because efficiency and effectiveness measures are not designed to respond to the 
diverse information needs of citizens, elected officials and public managers (Lytton, 
1961, Jackson, 1995 ).  They are not designed to provide information helpful in 
improving communication between citizens and government, motivating public 
managers, or promoting agency’s competence to legislators.  Instead of relying on such 
measurements, public organizations are better served by abandoning the search for a 
perfect tool and creating practical performance measurement tools that measure what is 
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important to key stakeholders, reflect the superior knowledge and familiarity of 
administrators, reflect local culture and account for the hard to discover, hard to frame 
social factors that affect performance (Ridley and Simon 1938). 
 
Although there is broad general agreement that the ultimate goal of performance 
measurement is improving organizational performance, differences of opinion remain 
with regards to what should be measured. As Behn (2003) indicated, meeting different 
objectives requires different measurements.  If the purpose for measuring performance is 
to control the actions of employees, performance measurement will compare actions of 
employees versus clearly specified actions that employees are asked to take.  If the 
objective is to motivate employees or stakeholders to improve performance, performance 
targets will be set and checked at interim points.  For public contracting, this returns to 
having clear goals before the first measurement is taken.  If the goal is to use GDOT 
contracting as an economic stimulus to underdeveloped sections of the state, or to bring 
in suppliers from underrepresented groups, these factors will be measured and reported.    
 
Although public and private organizations both use performance measurements to 
address stakeholder information needs, it should be noted that information needs for 
public organizations’ stakeholders differ from their private counterparts.  For example, 
public organizations must address the information needs of elected officials who will 
determine future funding levels for the organizations, citizens who will influence elected 
officials’ decision making and of public managers whose livelihood might very well 
depend on the performance measurements.  A public organization’s process for 
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performance measurement is also differs from the private sector because it is impacted by 
a legislative short-term decision- making cycle, the intangibility of services provided and 
monopsonist market positions (Wang, 2003).   
 
These characteristics that are unique to the public sector lead Wang (2010) to argue that 
the definition of performance measurement as an indicator of efficiency and effectiveness 
needs tweaking when considering their role in the public sector.  In the private sector, 
performance measurements such as revenue growth, cost savings and profitability are 
used as managerial tools for measuring organizational output.  In addition, the time 
period for monitoring and evaluating performance may extend through several fiscal 
years.  In the public sector, however, performance measurements are often used as quick 
feedback into the annual budgeting process which, is a short decision making cycle.  
Here, performance measurements will impact annual budget decisions.   
 
Consequently, performance measurements in the public sector are often not set up to 
capture long term performances such as efficiency and effectiveness.  Instead, shorter 
information cycles mean measurements are often geared to meet a more immediate need 
for information and may report on factors such as citizen satisfaction, service quality or 
number of clients served.  Also, the short decision making cycle in public organizations 
means selection of performance measurement is dynamic. Where private sector firms 
may lock into a static set of measurements, public sector performance measurements are 
susceptible to policy changes that come about in the short term decision making cycle. 
Measurements in the public sector, then, are not only charged with capturing information 
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quickly, but also with adapting to changes in required information due to annual changes 
in policy direction. 
 
These and other characteristics of information demands placed on public organizations 
create reporting performance measurements that can be noneconomic or the traditional 
effectiveness and efficiency measurements and supports the importance of understanding 
how factors outside the economic structure impact performance and performance 
measurement.   
 
While critical performances in public sector economic activity are rightly evaluated in 
terms of cost savings, jobs created, revenue generated, taxes cut or other economic terms 
(Domberger and Hensher 1993; Domberger and Jensen 1997; Boyne 1998; Boyne 1998; 
Hodge 1998; Hodge 2000; Van Slyke 2003; Brown and Potoski 2004; Bennett and Iossa 
2006), it is also true that some important policy goals conflict with such evaluation 
standards.  For instance, public officials often want their constituents to participate in the 
contracting process and want their districts to benefit from the policy. At times these 
goals will conflict with the goal of improving government effectiveness and efficiency.  
Similarly, efficiency ratios that are used effectively in the private sector are not designed 
to measure progress toward citizens’ demands for access and equity in the contracting 
process.  At times, addressing the goal of equity and access will require decisions that 
might not pass muster, if evaluated  on efficiency ratios. Citizens and elected officials 
want their preferences met even when they lower government efficiency and 
effectiveness.  This characteristic of the public sector draws back to the central idea of 
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organizations using measurements that are specific to their needs and environment. It also 
suggests that public organizations should not be expected to use purely economic 
measures when evaluating performance.   
 
Stakeholders expect the measures used to report public sector performance to fulfill 
citizen, public official and employee information requirements (Palumbo 1987; Wang 
2010). In some circumstances, however, economic measures cannot meet this obligation. 
In these cases other variables such as citizens’ response, quality of service delivered or 
client satisfaction are employed (Romzek and Johnston 1999; Romzek and Johnston 
1999; Romzek and Johnston 2000; Burghardt and Schochet 2001; Romzek and Johnston 
2002; Brown and Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 2004; Romzek and Johnston 2005; 
Brown and Potoski 2006) or the obligation is met using measurements such as quality of 
service delivery, citizen satisfaction or compliance statistics (Poister, McDavid et al. 
1979; Poister 2003; Wang 2010).  
  
In the public sector, it should also be expected that factors selected as performance 
measurements are influenced by short term budgeting and decision-making cycles.  
Collecting and reporting data for the annual budgeting cycle creates pressure for 
receiving information rapidly, and the shortness of funding cycles forced decision makers 
to demand quick feedback on the efficacy of policy decisions.  If policy makers base 
funding and policy decisions on economic data covering short periods of observation, 
they run the risk that their decisions are based on performance information that is 
incomplete, inconclusive and misleading. Using economic measures covering short 
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observation periods as performance measurements also threatens the ability to accurately 
capture the impact of policy changes (Wang, 2010).    Finally, when public organizations 
hold monopsonist market positions, the usefulness of measuring performances in purely 
economic terms is diminished.  Where there is no competitive market of buyers and 
sellers, economic measures lose much of their meaningfulness.  In some instances, a 
public agency is the only buyer for a service, for example, interstate highways, protection 
of ports or air traffic control. With only one buyer in a geographic area, there is no 
meaningful way to use interjurisdictional comparison of economic measures because the 
many social, political and geographical differences cannot be controlled (Wang 2010).  In 
situations where there is no basis for benchmarking performances, the ability of 
economic factors to provide meaningful evaluation of policy performances is 
significantly weakened, and using only economic measures of performance is not an 
advisable option.   Instead of a more basic economic articulation of performance, a 
broader view of performance is preferred. 
 
Along with the objective of providing relevant and reliable information on performance 
measurement to stakeholders, comes the challenge of identifying an appropriate method 
for structuring a process to capture and report the required information. Many acceptable 
approaches to structuring the performance measurement process exist, but most well 
designed approaches share characteristics of good data collection, objective description 
and accurate interpretation. The initial step of a well-designed performance measurement 
process centers on identifying clear, objective, specific measures, which address the 
quality of performances. They will help explain what action needs to be taken to help 
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accomplish objectives (Behn 1995).  These measures should  provide indicators of 
progress towards program or policy goals.  This key step is the foundation for ensuring 
that the performance measurement process reports necessary information.  Without this 
step, it is very likely that interesting but irrelevant information will be collected  (Poister, 
McDavid et al. 1979; McGowan and Poister 1985). 
 
While it is not difficult to identify components of good performance measurement, there 
are numerous challenges to that task.  The impact of these challenges is seen in the 
continued uncertainty that policy scholars have regarding performance measurement. 
There remains concern that meaningful performance measurements have not been 
established in local government.  Using data collected in a survey of public managers, 
Poister reports that the majority of respondents found the performance measurements 
they used to be only “somewhat effective” rather than “very effective” (Poister 1999).  A 
feeling of not having a fully effective performance measurement process is very likely 
attributable to another finding from that study, which found that only 30% of respondents 
accepted input from rank-in-file employees when developing the performance 
measurement system, and 60% of respondents reported problems getting lower level 
employees to support the system.  Both managers and employees were found to resist 








Approaches to Understanding Public Contacting 
 
The Transaction Cost Approach 
Predominate understanding of public contracting is heavily influenced by transaction cost 
economics (TCE) propositions (Williamson 1985; Williamson 1998; Willamson 1999 ).  
Consequently policy analyses are influenced by the proposition that the best way to 
understand the circumstances under which public contracting will occur is by examining 
the specifics of each transaction. Those specifics are to be examined using these 
fundamental dimensions:  specificity of  assets (Prager 1994; Domberger and Jensen 
1997; Romzek and Johnston 1999; Romzek and Johnston 2002; Brown and Potoski 2003; 
Van Slyke 2003; Brown and Potoski 2004; Rangan, Samii et al. 2006) ,  frequency of the 
transaction and environmental  uncertainty (Smith 1996; Lane 2001; Hefetz and Warner 
2004; Brudney, Fernandez et al. 2005; Martin 2005; Romzek and Johnston 2005) .   
 
According to TCE propositions transactions involving highly specific assets, those that 
have little or no utilization outside their stated purpose should be governed by a 
hierarchy.  If these assets are not controlled internally, the indirect costs of searching for 
vendors, bargaining with vendors and monitoring their performance will push total cost 
of contracting higher than the cost of keeping the work in-house.  Contracting for these 
services will also increase the risk of vendor nonperformance, because nonperformance 
or negligence may be hard to detect.  Additionally, contract performance is threatened 
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because when highly specific assets are involved, the original contract winner is typically 
locked into the contract and any benefits of a competitive market erode (Brown and 
Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 
2004; Brown and Potoski 2004; Brown and Potoski 2006). 
 
 Transactions involving assets with low specificity can be executed in the market.  TCE 
logic, which is rooted in minimizing indirect costs associated with contracting, explains 
that there is minimum cost in searching for contractors, bargaining with them and 
monitoring their performance when the work is routine and involves assets with low 
specificity.  With this type of asset, there is also low risk associated with undetected 
vendor nonperformance.   
 
When applied to public contracting, TCE presents the uncomplicated argument that 
effective performance in public contracting is achieved by ensuring that only tasks for 
which the bureau is not the appropriate governance structure are contracted out, and that 
the bureau has an effective monitoring process for the work it contracts out.   Under these 
circumstances service delivery risks are reduced (Kettl 1993; Sclar 2000) and  the 
likelihood of success increased (Brown and Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 2003; 
Brown and Potoski 2004; Brown and Potoski 2006).    
 
In a TCE approach, asset specificity is of critical importance because it indicates the 
value parties stand to lose as a result of environmental or behavioral uncertainty in the 
exchange process.  If an asset that is required to execute a function of the bureau is highly 
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specific and the bureau does not control the asset, the bureau is at risk for vendor 
nonperformance.  For example if a municipality contracts out for fire protection services 
it has to accept the risk that when the courthouse is on fire, the vendor will not 
immediately respond to the call or will arrive with a poorly maintained hook and ladder 
truck.  Using the TCE concept of contract performance, success depends on mitigating 
the risks of nonperformance, which in turn depends on assigning the task of fire 
protection to the organization most likely to show up, on time, with a working fire truck. 
On the other hand, contracts which can be executed using assets with low specificity, for 
example tree trimming, are less vulnerable to principal-agent problems, do not require 
intense agency oversight and can be addressed in the market (Prager 1994; Domberger 
and Jensen 1997; Romzek and Johnston 1999; Romzek and Johnston 2002; Brown and 
Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2003; Brown and Potoski 2004; Rangan, Samii et al. 2006).    
 
 
The TCE approach also proposes that contracting performance is determined, but to a 
lesser degree, by frequency of the transaction and environmental uncertainty.  Again, the 
focus is on the individual transaction, and quality of performance is argued to be assured 
by assigning the transactions to the organization best capable of handling the frequency.  
In terms of public contracting, the frequency argument suggests the bureau should 
contract out routine, pedestrian functions (Smith 1996; Lane 2001; Hefetz and Warner 
2004; Brudney, Fernandez et al. 2005; Martin 2005; Romzek and Johnston 2005).   
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 TCE arguments provide direction on make or buy decisions. They propose that 
successful contracting is the result of correct make or buy decisions. The theory’s 
propositions state that the decision to contract out depends on whether the assets required 
to complete the transaction are highly specific and how frequently the agency needs these 
assets employed ( Joskow, 1987,Klein, 1989 Masten, Meehan,&Snyder, 1989 Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, Kumar 2006 ,Chiou and Shen (2006) ,Sun, Kwon, 2006,Liao and Lin 
(2006),Nizquez et.al (2007) ),Yu, Liao and Lin (2006), Nizquez et.al (2007).  
Transactions are to be sent to the market when the assets involved have low specificity 
and are easily replaceable.  Transactions that are routine are also best executed in the 
market (Claro, Hagelaar, Omta 2003) Wang (2002) Nizquez, Iglesias Rodriquez-Del-
Bosque( 2007), Joshi and Stump (1999)(Brown and Potoski 2003; Brown and Potoski 
2003; Brown, Falk et al. 2004; Brown and Potoski 2004; Brown and Potoski 2004).  
 
 When this approach is used in contacting decision making, public managers need to 
consider the dimensions of asset specificity, frequency and environment uncertainty. 
When correctly assessed, these dimensions will identify the type of governance best 
suited to deliver superior performance. TCE also proposes that when agencies make 
contracting decisions based on these dimensions, opportunism is controlled (Brown and 
Potoski 2003); inherent risk in contracting is mitigated (Brown and Potoski 2003); 
managerial capacity within the bureau is maintained (Brown and Potoski 2004; Brown 
and Potoski 2006) and stakeholder values are maintained (Brown and Potoski 2006).   
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TCE propositions are rooted in the concept of successful performance as a function of 
using asset specificity to assign transactions to the correct governance structure.  An 
alternate way of expressing that concept is successful performance is a function of 
assigning transactions based on organizational capacity.  TCE propositions can be 
restated as arguing that successful contracting performance results from assigning 
transactions to organizations that have the capability, knowledge and resources to 
complete the transaction and will do so with minimum monitoring.  In other words, TCE 
propositions resemble an argument of organizational capacity.   
 
If TCE arguments are viewed as propositions of organizational capacity, they are not 
hampered by the narrow focus on asset specificity.  Brown and Potoski note, problems 
exist in determining the impact asset specificity has on contracting, when researchers 
cannot clearly define levels of asset specificity (2003). There is a continuum of asset 
specificity that does not have clear demarcation. How does a public manager decide the 
specificity of a water tank or a utility pole?  Some even argue that the definition of asset 
specificity needs to be expanded beyond hard assets and revised to include highly 
specific human assets and intellectual capital (Subramani, and Venkatraman 2003, 
(Brown and Potoski 2003).    
 
Understanding contract performance through a TCE focus on asset specificity is also 
problematic in certain industries.  Aubert, Rivard and Patry (2004) used incomplete 
contract theory and transaction costs theory to test whether assets’ specificity and 
environmental uncertainty influenced the level of outsourcing in 335 information 
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technology firms. They concluded that uncertainty is a deterrent to outsourcing, but could 
find no conclusive evidence on the role of asset specificity.  Perry, Sengupta and Krapfel 
(2004) found that in high tech firms, trust and commitment, rather than asset specificity 
determined when hybrid governance structures such as alliances were formed.  Similarly, 
Hsieh (2004) used transactional cost theory and relational exchange theory and found that 
successful partnerships are the result of parties sharing information, commitment and 
trust.  Sheng, Brown et.al (2006) results found that inter-organizational communication, 
not asset specificity, is the critical determinant of relational governance.  
 
Hsieh (2004), Aubert, Rivard and Patry (2004) reveal an important concern about the 
range of asset types over which TCE approaches are effective.  Results from the studies 
indicate that the reliability of TCE propositions weaken in highly technical environments.   
Asset specificity was not performing as hypothesized.  Rather than functioning as “the 
big locomotive” which drives successful performance, asset specificity assumed a more 
peripheral role and  had less impact on performance than expected. 
 
The reliability of TCE propositions are questioned with regard to asset type, industry type 
and also in terms of how they relate to the public sector.  There is concern that public and 
private organizations are so different that TCE propositions are not applicable to the 
public sector.  The proposition that good performance is the result of assigning 
transactions to the proper governance structure does not account for political factors 
found in the public sector.  These factors can and will influence the make or buy decision, 
with little regard to TCE arguments.  Another difference between the sectors that TCE 
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does not account for is the reality that no market option or alternative governance 
structure exists for many of the goods and services the public sector produces (Moe 
1990). There is no make or buy decision where there are no alternative suppliers of 
government functions such as foreign diplomacy, national security or tax collection.  
 
 Moe (1990) questions whether TCE is reliable in an environment where deciding the 
governance structure for economic exchange is not as simple as having objective, 
unbiased managers evaluate assets, frequency and uncertainty.  Instead Moe is concerned 
with TCE performance in an environment constrained by political considerations and 
how the theory addresses the impact of having political considerations direct transactions 
to preferred governance structures.  TCE also fails to address the reality that in the public 
sector, there are often no options for governance structure.  These unique characteristics 
of public sector transactions create difficulty for approaches based on the freedom to 
assign transactions to the best of several governance structure options.    
                                               
In large part, TCE approaches are built on comparisons of how different governance 
structures minimize transaction costs.  For TCE to work multiple governance structures 
must exist and transactions must be assigned to them without bias or subjectivity.  It is 
only when these two prerequisites are met that contracting performances are predicted to 
be successful.  These requirements underlie questions regarding the usefulness of 
transaction costs approaches in public contracting.  There is no explanation of how the 
market would economize on transaction costs associated with national defense, foreign 
policy or interstate highway systems, for example.  Nor do the transaction cost 
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approaches explain how markets would economize on local judicial systems or natural 
resource allocations.  Such public functions involve economic exchange, yet there are no 
alternate governance structures.  
 
Moe (1990) points out that even if it were possible to find market alternatives to such 
bureau functions, there is no way to transfer the accountability associated with the 
function. Public officials cannot sell or contract out their public authority. The 
accountability issue is unique to the public sector.  Citizens and elected officials are 
going to hold public managers accountability for performance. Even if work is contracted 
out, the accountability remains in-house.  This gives Moe more reason to disagree that 
transaction costs economics are generalizable to the public sector.  
 
The accountability that remains in-house, the lack of alternative governance structures for 
some public services and the influence of political factors combine to undermine the 
transferability of TCE propositions to the public sector. They call the central tenet of 
TCE, unbiased assignment of transactions to the correct governance structure, into 
question.  The realities of economic exchange in the public sector also reflect back to 
Coase’s original divergence from neoclassical thought, when Coase argued that economic 
theory had to reflect the realities of the phenomena examined (Coase 1937). Moe’s 
argument is in line with Coase’s critique.  Coase believed that if the theory does not 
reflect observable reality, then it is not the correct theory.  Moe argues that TCE, 
although heavily relied upon in contracting literature, does not reflect observable reality 
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in the public sector and consequently something different is required to explain what is 
happening. 
  
Williamson (1999) considered Moe's argument and responded that a transaction approach 
remains relevant and reliable when considering the public bureau as an alternate 
governance structure to the market and the firm.  Williamson argued that asset specificity 
also functions as the “big locomotive” even when considering the public bureau's 
transactions. Williamson (1999) contends that the adjustment required for TCE to address 
unique characteristics of public sector transactions is considering that the important assets 
in the bureau are human rather than physical.  The degree of specificity of a public 
bureau’s human assets is what would determine the appropriate governance structure for 
public bureau transactions.  Along with this modification in defining the critical assets, 
Williamson also introduces probity, a new hazard that must be considered.  Probity or 
absolute integrity is the hazard that must be present in public bureau transactions, but 
also, in any transaction driven by human asset specificity.   
 
The modification of TCE to include probity and specificity of human assets, was intended 
to address critics such as Moe (Moe 1990), who questioned the appropriateness of using 
TCE to analyze public bureau decisions.  By adding requirements for personal integrity 
and consideration of specific human assets, the TCE modification attempted to address 
peculiarities and complexities of the bureau. However, the modification did not 
adequately address critical issues raised by Moe.  Williamson argued that with the 
modifications, TCE accounted for specificity of human assets housed in public officials.  
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Williamson did not, however, acknowledge that those specific human assets were 
inseparable from a political structure fully capable of restricting their portability.  
Williamson accounted for bureau assets being human rather than physical, but never 
quite address the argument that the assets were controlled by a political structure and 
could be assigned to a governance structure based on political expediency.  Nor did 
Williamson acknowledge that some public sector human assets, such as some employed 
in national defense and national intelligence, are valuable only to the extent they have 
access to proprietary information, processes and equipment owned by the public sector.  
 
Another area where transaction cost theory and public contracting are misaligned is in 
TCE theory’s light treatment of intangible assets, such as public trust and accountability. 
These assets are essential to the public sector, but escape analysis in TCE theory.  For 
example, consider that citizens give the public sector responsibility for national defense, 
public health, public safety and foreign policy, largely because they prefer such functions 
be addressed free from profit motivation. Citizens tend to believe that their best interests 
are served when the supplier of such services is not motivated by profit. In such 
situations, the intangible asset, public trust, dictates and restricts the governance structure 
selected to deliver the service. Since, in the public sector, intangible assets can dictate 
governance structure, they should be addressed in TCE theory.  The fact that they are not 




The key to transaction cost economics is its focus on assigning transactions to the 
governance structure best prepared to execute it, while minimizing search and monitoring 
costs. Its shortcomings, however, are particularly noticeable when applied in the public 
sector. Differences, such as being highly influenced by politics, which can either hamper 
or prevent freely assigning transactions, weaken TCE propositions.  The presence and 
importance of intangible assets such as public trust and accountability also restrain the 
effectiveness of TCE propositions in explaining public contract performance.  Added to 
these shortcomings is a somewhat cursory examination of human assets and their 
relational content. TCE explains that human assets should be valued according to their 
specificity and treated as other assets, but it does not delve into understanding how 
human assets, their connections to other human assets and the relational structure impacts 
performance.  The combination of these shortcomings allows critique that TCE falls short 
of being a strong framework for understanding public contracting.  
 
Had Williamson remained closer to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework 
from which TCE is derived human assets would have been accounted for, because NIE 
calls for relying on real world observation, not theoretical abstraction.  Economists such 
as Davis and North chose to follow Coase’s advice (1937).  They evaluated, then 
confirmed the impact of social norms and influences or “rules of the game” on economic 
performances (Davis and North 1971; North 1990; North 1991). In contrast, Williamson 
and others stayed focused on evaluating the impact of governance structures on economic 
performances and importance of organizational capacity (Williamson 1985; Klein 1998; 
Willamson 2000).  Because Williamson chose to go that route, TCE theory falls short in 
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determining how legal, political, religious or social influences impact contract 
performances.   
 
 A TCE logic model that more accurately reflected NIE concepts would tie economic 
performance to transaction costs and transaction costs to social and political influences.  
What is available however is a transaction costs approach proposing that the true cost of 
completing economic exchange depends on the amount of monitoring and oversight 
required to ensure successful completion.  It does this without recognizing that the 
amount of monitoring and oversight required is influenced by the level of trust and the 
quality of communication between parties engaged in exchange. Reluctance to accept the 
benefits of trust might be a result of TCE being a cousin to principal agent theory, which 
is concerned with the risks of goal incongruence and information assymmetries between 
principals and vendors (Miller, 1992). Perhaps Williamson shares the belief that private 
firms are prone to opportunism (Light, 2000; Wise, 1990), will shirk responsibility and 
deliver a lower quality product in order to increase profits (Brown and Potoski, 2003). 
There must be a reason why Williamson chooses not to fully consider the benefits social 
relations can have on all contracts, as embeddedness theory suggests.  
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Socio-Economic Approaches to Contracting 
 
Socio-economic and legal theories offer alternative explanations of contracting 
performance. Both theories offer critique that economic approaches explain contracting 
outcomes without recognizing the full impact of social influence on performance.  They 
present more explicit arguments that social structure and social relations impact 
economic performance.  Where Williamson (1985) recognizes social influence when 
executing incomplete contracts, legal theorists argue that all economic exchange, 
including contracting, is rooted in a social matrix.  They further argue that if any analysis 
of economic transactions is to be efficient, the analysis must include contextual analysis 
of relations influencing the transaction (MacNeil 1974; MacNeil 1985; MacNeil 2000; 
Brown, Falk et al. 2004; Rahman and Kumaraswamu 2004; Doornik 2006; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamu 2007).  A key proposition of relational contracting theory is the argument 
that exchange between economic factors is seldom free of the artifacts of personal 
relations, and it is important to account for these artifacts when explaining contracting 
activity. 
 
The argument that social artifacts must be accounted for is found in socio-economic and 
legal critiques of approaches that undersocialize economic performance. The heart of the 
argument is that although theorized, a strict demarcation between society and economy is 
not observed in economic exchange.  Instead, what is observed is social structure exerting 
influence that shapes economic performances (Polanyi 1944; Polanyi 1945).   The 
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necessity of theory that accurately reflects this observed behavior is the catalyst for 
arguments that performance must be analyzed within a social context (Polanyi 1944; 
Polanyi 2001). It is what creates a consistent demand for recognizing that relying on 
theoretical constructions, rather than observed behavior, creates an undersocialized view 
of economic behavior (Granovetter 1985).  
 
Embeddedness theory asserts a need to view economic activity in context of the 
surrounding social structure.  In contrast to economic approaches, it argues that social 
factors are essential to a full understanding of economic behavior.  Embeddedness theory 
believes that economic activity should be examined through a lens that brings the 
connection between social structure and economic performances to the forefront.  The 
goal of this theory is to increase understanding of economic phenomena by first 
recognizing that economic activity occurs within the greater social structure and second, 
by acknowledging that the impact of social organization on economic phenomena is 
central, rather than peripheral, to understanding economic behavior.  To be clear, 
embeddedness theory proposes using analysis of social relations as a complement to 
economic analysis, not as a rival explanation (Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 1985).   
 
The strength of embeddedness theory vis a vis economic theory is its grounding in 
observed behavior.  Based on  observations, embeddedness theory proposes that an 
economic actor’s social network creates a system of incentives and disincentives which 
constrain malfeasance, limit opportunism and lead to successful economic performances 
(Granovetter 1985).  In this sense, embeddedness and TCE concepts are somewhat 
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aligned. Both agree that structural influences affect economic success.  The difference 
lies in the types of structures argued to influence performances.  TCE argues that 
governance structures overseeing exchange will determine performance, while 
embeddedness approaches argue that the social structures in which economic activity are 
embedded will greatly influence performances.  It is important to note that although an 
embeddedness argument places social relations in a central position, it does not present 
analysis of social relations as replacement of economic analysis.  Rather, analysis of 
social relations is presented as a means of gaining additional understanding. The 
embeddedness argument does not state that social structure dominates economic structure 
nor does it argue that social structure governs economic behavior.  Instead, the 
embeddedness theory is one of a symbiotic relationship between economic, social and 
other institutions (Polanyi 1944, 2001).  Fully explaining one institution requires 
understanding the others. 
 
Network Structure Approach 
 When social structure is discussed as an influence of market activity, it is often presented 
in terms that can be quantified.  One of the more frequently used means of quantifying 
social influences is through the language of network analysis.  This language formalizes 
social relations as a mappable structure then explains how structural characteristics of a 
social network, such as proximity and density, can be managed to improve performance 
(Prager 1994; Milward 1995; Provan and Milward 1995; Milward and Provan 1998; 
Milward and Provan 2000; Milward and Provan 2001; Provan and Milward 2001; 
Milward and Provan 2003; Provan, Vezaie et al. 2005; Provan and Fish 2007) 
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(Markovsky, Willer et al. 1988; Panet and Trebilcock 1998; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 
Perry-Smith 2003). 
 
Network studies rarely show any interest in examining the quality of the tie between 
actors or how the quality of ties influences performance or performance measurement 
(Burt 1983; Burt 1983; Burt 1983; Galaskiewicz 1985; Burt 1987; Markovsky, Willer et 
al. 1988; Burt 1992; Provan and Milward 1995; Milward and K.G> 1998; Human 2000; 
Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Provan and Milward 2001; Perry-Smith 2003; Isett and 
Provan 2005; Provan, Vezaie et al. 2005; Provan and Fish 2007; Tiwana 2008).   
 
In a network structure approach, the concept of embeddedness is explained in term of 
social network density, size, position or stability.  Network density identifies the number 
of connections an actor has, size indicates a count of network members, position 
describes how quickly a network member can reach other members and stability reflects 
the pattern of members entering and exiting the network.  In other words, the focus is on 
how a collection of social relations impacts an individual actor’s economic performance. 
The approach maintains that the relationship between social ties and economics is best 
explained by the arrangement of ties within a social network, rather than the nature of the 
tie.   
 
To further explore the idea of structural influence on performances, consider Ostrom’s 
work (1990) on the role played by network size.  Ostrom theorized that the relationship 
between social structure and economic performances could be understood by examining 
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the size of the actor’s social network.  In the discussion of network size, Ostrom 
highlighted the importance of smaller networks.  Ostrom found that when dyads were 
arranged in nonhierarchical structures or flat networks, smaller and more stable clusters 
formed.  This flatter arrangement of social relations improves performances because it 
offers network members avenues to increase both frequency and intensity of interaction 
with network members.  As these factors increase, trust and ease of communication also 
increase.   Ostrom argued that if we want to understand how to improve performances 
from economic activity, we need to understand the frequency and intensity of  interaction 
between economic partners. 
 
In contrast, Burt (1992) agreed with Ostrom that size matters, but argued that bigger is 
better.  Specifically, Burt found that large diverse networks were more likely to be rich in 
the resources necessary for successful performances; not because of the number of actors 
in the network, but due to the diversity of resources made available within larger 
networks. Bigger is better, but only if bigger means that a larger amount of desired 
resources are readily available to network members. In fact, Burt proposed that if  bigger 
is simply increased  homogeneity of resources, it could cripple a network with 
redundancy.  As previously discussed, redundancy is associated with institutionalized 
routines which impede introducing new information and processes.  The performance of 




Further support for differentiating between network size and scope impacts performances 
is presented by Elango and Pattnaik’s (2007) who found that smaller networks with broad 
scopes had greater access to exposure in international markets than small networks that 
were less broad.  Similarly, Hung (2005) agreed that scope, not the size of networks 
matters.  Hung found that diversity in networks was associated with relatively more 
freedom in organizational choices because networks with broader scopes were less tied to 
organizational routines and institutionalism, which opened networks up to benefits from 
new routines. The freedom to try new routines then opened paths for new information 
and knowledge transfer, which ultimately increased chances for successful performances.    
 
When analyzing the relationship between social relations and performances from a 
structural approach, size of the network of social relations should be considered on two 
dimensions: diversity of resources available and ease of communication.  The network’s 
impact on performances is not determined by its size, but by the nature and number of 
resources contained within. In addition, activity that benefits from trust or easy 
communication between partners is expected to gain better performance from flatter 
networks that form small tight knit clusters. On the other hand, activity that profits from 
the freedom to introduce new routines, timely knowledge transfer and freedom from 
organizational institutionalism, will thrive in larger networks. 
 
Another means of using social network structure theory to explain the relationship 
between social relations and economic performance involves identifying gaps or holes in 
the network.  The concept of structural holes explains the absence of connection between 
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two different networks. Structural holes create competitive advantages for the actor who 
recognizes unconnected networks that have resources that might benefit the other, and 
have no conduit for exchange.  The competitive advantage is realized when the actor 
inserts himself as a connection between disconnected networks and in turn, benefits from 
the resources available in both.  The actor is  guaranteed a place of importance, as long as 
resource exchanges can only happen through him. Being located in this network position 
places the advantaged actor in the function of a bridge, which means the actor has early 
access to reliable information from two separated groups.  Information moving through 
the bridge is available to other network members only when delivered by the bridging 
actor (Burt 1992; Wasserman and Faust 1994)).   
 
Reviews of structural holes and bridges support arguments that social connections are 
associated with improved performances, but only when the connection leads to improved 
access to desired resources. For example, in a study of Canadian mutual funds, Zaheer 
and Bell (2005) found that firms positioned as bridges were better innovators and 
delivered enhanced firm performance because they had access to new information and 
processes.   Rhee (2004) added a qualification to the structural hole argument by finding 
that  a position as a bridge leads to successful performances only when the bridges 
connected currently relevant actors; bridges were important only if the actors being 
bridged were important to each other. Tiwana (2008) confirmed that for social relations 
to impact economic performances, they needed to be between actors who possessed 
resources valuable to the other.  Tiwana analyzed forty-two different innovation alliances 
between a major American firm and its alliance partners and confirmed that bridging ties 
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provide innovation potential by increasing access to a wider diversity of ideas and 
processes. The ties between actors were able to facilitate improved performances because 
they encouraged the exchange of valuable resources.  
 
Although the relationship between bridged social relations and positive economic 
performances is fairly consistent, bridged relations are not a panacea.  Similar to other 
aspects of social/economic relationships, bridges have shortcomings.  In particular, 
Tiwana (2008) cautioned that while bridged relations facilitate access to new knowledge, 
they do not facilitate integration capacity. Bridged relations connect actors; the actors 
themselves, however, must transfer and absorb benefits.   As a result of this finding, 
Tiwana proposed that the strength of the tie between actors must be considered.  
Specifically Tiwana argued that bridged ties were more effective when they are made 
with strong ties because having bridges made with strong ties enabled fuller utilization of 
each tie’s specific benefit.  Strong ties’ ability to increase integration capacity between 
two organizations was combined with bridging ties’ ability to provide access to new 
knowledge.  This complementary relationship between strong ties and bridging ties 
increased a network’s ambidexterity by providing access to new information and at the 
same time increasing the ability to integrate innovation into the network. 
 
Content of Social Ties Approach 
Like other indicators of network structure, bridges and structural holes provide a 
meaningful way of understanding how social relations influence performances from 
economic activity.  A strong case can be made that a structural form of analysis provides 
 39 
sufficient insight into the relationship between economic activity and the social matrix 
into which it is embedded. However, there are caveats in relying on this form of analysis.  
For example, Rhee (2004) agrees that structural analysis is important, but argues that, in 
isolation, structural elements:  size, density, bridges or holes are not causal factors in 
economic performances.  Rhee offers that it is the qualitative aspect of ties that explains 
causality.  In this argument, Rhee proposes that the location of network members is not 
the superior factor influencing performances.  Instead it is the quality of the tie that 
determines how social relations come to impact economic performance. 
 
Rhee’s (2004) argument, favoring the quality of dyadic ties over network structural 
arrangements, is one of several critiquing a focus on network structural elements (Baker 
1984; Granovetter 1985; Baker 1990; Burt 1992; Degenne and Michael 19991).  The 
basis of the critique is that a focus on structural elements strays away from Polanyi’s 
basic tenets that man’s participation in the market was driven by a desire to safeguard:  
(1) social standing (2) social claims and (3) social assets (Polanyi 1944; Polanyi 1945; 
Krippner, Granovetter et al. 2004).  Polanyi’s stance is that the connection between social 
and economic is intentional; social man identifies the relations he believes will protect his 
social standing and economic performance is a function of those intentional choices.  
Consider a recent college graduate who is presented two housing options.  The graduate 
can either purchase a home in a stable, moderate income housing development very close 
to his office or he can rent an apartment, twenty miles away, in a complex near 
restaurants, entertainment venues and shops favored by other young college graduates.  
Using the Polanyi argument, we would expect the young graduate to choose apartment 
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life, and based on this selection, create an economic scenario that foregoes building 
equity through homeownership and incurs increased transportation costs. The economic 
impact on the graduate’s life is not a result of how the graduate is situated in a social 
network; it is the result of his safeguarding social assets.  Another way of expressing this 
concept and the critique of network structure analysis is ‘if you want to understand 
economic man, first understand social man’; and the best way to do so is through 
observation, rather than theoretical constructions (Polanyi 1944).   
  
If analysis of structural elements such as size, position and bridges does not sufficiently 
explain what is observed in the relationship between the social matrix and performances, 
what is the preferred unit of analysis?  Socio-economists who argue that the idea of 
studying only the structure of networks is “an extreme and foolish position” (Granovetter 
2004, p.114 advance the idea of focusing on the content of social ties. 
 
Using a content of ties approach rather than a structural approach changes the unit of 
analysis to the quality of the relation, rather than the pattern of how relations are 
configured within a network.  Dyadic relations between actors are deconstructed into 
dimensions of frequency and intensity of interaction.  An example of this approach is 
Granovetter’s (1983) study of weak and strong ties, where tie strength is defined as a 
measurement of the “combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy 
(mutual confiding), and reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 
1973, p.1361). There are two ideas to keep in mind in understanding the role tie strength 
plays in determining performances.  First, the relationship is dependent on environmental 
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specifics; second, the nomenclature is not an indicator of effectiveness.  Weak ties can be 
more effective than strong ties, given the right environment. 
 
For example, weak ties connecting two groups which otherwise would have no path to 
each other can positively impact performances. Granovetter (1973) finds weak ties 
improve job seekers access to information about available positions.  The Granovetter 
studies (1973, 1983) present counterintuitive evidence that infrequent and weak relations 
are more productive in delivering positive performances than intense and frequent ones.  
Actors who maintain weak ties have greater capacity to manage multiple ties than ones 
who maintain strong ties.  Simply put, human emotional and physical limitations restrict 
the number of intense, frequent relations an actor can manage.  Actors can; however, 
manage a much larger number of relations if they are less intense and less frequent. This 
indicates that actors maintaining a large number of weak ties will have access to larger 
amounts of diverse resources. In the case of Granovetter’s’ job seekers, the causal factor 
is not the weakness of the tie, but the freedom to have ties to a diversity of job searching 
resources. Langlois confirmed the role of weak ties, using frequency of recent contact as 
a measure of tie strength.  Langlois also found that new jobs came through weak ties 
rather than strong ties (1977).  
 
Studies on the relationship between innovation performances and content of network ties 
also confirm the importance of understanding the quality of the social tie. Recent studies 
(Dittrich, Duysters, deMan, 2007; Bell and Zaheer, 2007; Stanko, Bonner and Calantone, 
2007) support earlier findings that weak ties influence performances.  Dittrich, Dysters, 
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and deMan’s study of the international firm, IBM, found that IBM transformed and 
reenergized itself when it executed a two pronged strategy of loosening ties with existing 
partners and forming weaker ties with new partners.  This assisted IBM in transforming  
from a computer hardware company to a global technology service and software 
provider.  Similar to findings in the IBM study, Tiwana (2008) finds weak ties increase 
exposure to new information and ultimately improve performances. When both weak and 
strong ties are present, weak ties continue to show evidence of significantly influencing 
performances.   This is a dynamic that holds true even when strong ties are predominate.  
While studying the impact of the quality of social relations on knowledge transfer, Levin 
and Cross found that at times the influence of weak ties may be overshadowed by the 
influence of strong ones, but weak ties still exert influence on performances (2004).   
 
 The strength of weak ties is consistently found to reside in their ability to increase access 
to critical resources.   In the IBM study (Dittrich, Duysters, deMan, 2007), weak ties were 
identified as a means of increasing access to new processes and information necessary for 
transformation.  The Levin and Cross (2004) and Granovetter (1973) studies indicate that 
weak ties facilitate increased flows of new or unique information by opening the number 
of paths for them to reach actors.   
 
Actors with weak ties are receptive to unique or new information because they have 
fewer social assets at risk. If the new information proves incorrect or unhelpful, those 
with weak ties suffer minimal loss of social assets.  In other words, actors with weak ties 
are free to take risks by introducing novel information into their network, because they 
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have so little at stake (Granovetter, 1973).  In some respect, they are in the enviable 
position of having little at risk with an opportunity for great reward.  
 
In contrast to weak ties that increase access to resources,  strong ties affect performances 
by improving absorptive capacity (Tiwana 2008). Relation ties that involve frequent or 
intense interaction create an ease of communication between actors.  As actors come to 
understand each other’s language better, more of what is being said is being correctly 
understood.   Also, it is through repeated shared experiences that exchange partners gain 
insight into the cultural norms of each other. Understanding such norms helps exchange 
partners avoid missteps, which could hinder exchange.  
 
Fukugawa (2006) explains that strong relational ties are actually a reflection of strong 
commitment, and it is mutual strong commitment that leads to positive performances.  
Establishing and maintaining strong ties requires actors to consistently commit time, 
energy and resources to each other.  This continuous stream of mutual giving creates trust 
and provides actors the freedom to initiate changes and to quickly respond to changes, 
without fear of ruining the relationship. 
 
  Where Granovetter (1973) states that weak ties provide information on job leads, 
Fukugawa counters that strong ties create a commitment to help, and it is the 
commitment to help that facilitates successful performances.  The difference between the 
two types of ties can be considered a difference in intentionality. Weak ties suggest 
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passive activity in passing along information which the receiver may chose to pursue, 
while strong ties suggest a more active commitment to arrive at a positive performance.   
 
Fukugawa also presents findings that oppose Dittrich, Dysters and deMan (2007).  Recall 
this study found that moving from strong alliances to weak ties led to IBM’s successful 
corporate transformation. These studies of corporate partners found successful 
performances associated with the strong ties found in dense networks.  Instead of finding 
benefits from increased information flows and access to new processes, Fukygawa and 
others found a connection that showed that partners with high levels of commitment, 
stability and predictability experienced successful performances (Fukugawa, 2006, 
Beugelskijk, Koen, and Noorderhave, 2006).    
 
However, it should be noted that excessive amounts of strong ties can be 
counterproductive.  McFadyen and Cannella (2004) examined the relationship between 
social capital and knowledge creation, and noted that as the number of strong relations 
increased, the returns to knowledge decreased.  They found that the strength of the 
relation, defined as the number of interactions with the same actor, produced increasing 
returns  to a point, then produced diminishing returns to knowledge creation.  This 
finding is important as it indicates that the relationship between strong ties and 
performances is curvilinear.  Similar to the results generated by small tight knit networks, 
an overabundance of strong ties institutionalizes routines.  And at some point, regardless 
of the depth of mutual trust and commitment, the relationship will not have the breath of 
resources required for continued positive results.  
 45 
 
Combination of Structural and Content of Ties Approach 
Social relations can be defined by the tie between actors, or formalized by the way they 
are structured into a network. Regardless of the way the concept is formalized, the 
essence of both structural and strength of tie approaches lies in explaining the capacity of 
parties to absorb benefits available through social relations. Not all find structural and 
strength of tie approaches mutually exclusive.  Some find it beneficial to combine the two 
approaches into one comprehensive proposition.  Tiwana (2008) combined the structural 
concept of bridging with the qualitative concept of strong ties to argue that social 
relations improve performances.   Rhee (2004) supported this approach, advocating that 
analysis of network structure without considering the quality of the tie was insufficient.   
 
Likewise, Uzzi’s preference for a combined approach is evident in a study of the New 
York garment industry (1996).  Using both network structure and social embeddedness 
variables, Uzzi creates a flexible model that isolates the impact and assesses the 
incremental value of both structural and qualitative variables.   Specifically, Uzzi used 
control models that combined factors such as organization size and age with network 
structure variables e.g. network size and centrality to explain the likelihood of firms 
surviving in the garment industry. Uzzi then added variables that reflected the quality of 
the relationship between contractors and their sub-contractors to the model.  Uzzi found 
the addition of embeddedness variables “significantly improve the fit of baseline control 
models” (Uzzi, 1996, p.690). The addition of the social relations variables, whether 
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structural or qualitative, increased the amount of variation explained and led to improved 
explanations of firms’ ability to survive in a highly competitive market. 
 
 Uzzi’s (1996) particularly relevant work addresses the relationship between social 
relations and economic activity in the context of contracting. Uzzi begins explaining the 
impact of embeddedness by first understanding how social relations in the market are 
structured, and how this structuring impacts whether a tie will be defined as embedded or 
arms-length.  Uzzi analyzes these relations between clothing manufacturers and their 
contractors, and determines that nearly 80 percent of transactions between the garment 
manufactures and contractors use weak ties.  Uzzi then explains that since ties in the 
market are marked by exchanges involving 10 percent or less of a manufacturers work, 
these ties are considered arms-length. These ties are routine in the industry and do not 
signify a special relationship between the manufacturer and the contractor.  Uzzi explains 
that in the garment industry, it is not until a manufacturer sends at least 20-25 percent of 
its work to a principal contractor that the relations are defined as embedded ties or 
“special”.  However, once Uzzi locates embedded ties in the garment industry, Uzzi 
confirms that firms with socially founded embedded business ties have positive effects on 
organization outcomes. 
 
 The Uzzi approach shows that there is an option for explaining public contracting in a 
way that avoids some of the shortcomings of transactions cost approaches.  Specifically, 
where TCE analysis undersocializes economic activity by arguing that controlling 
indirect costs by properly assigning work to either internal or external governance is the 
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key to successful performances, embeddedness theory argues that for such analysis to be 
complete, it must recognize the social structure in which the transaction is embedded and 
the influence that structure is exerting on performance. This theory proposes that 
regardless of the type of governance structure and its ability to minimize cost, the 
transaction occurs in a social structure which exerts its own influence on the outcome 
(Uzzi 1996; Uzzi 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie 2002; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003; Uzzi 2004).   
 
Environmental Influences 
The number of conflicting claims found in the role network size, strength of tie and other 
characteristics suggest some type of unidentified, exogeneous influence is at work. These 
influences are most likely environmental. Along with the structure or strength of social 
ties, they shape the impact social relations have on performance.   Uzzi explains the need 
to understand environmental context this way, “the performances of embeddedness are 
not unconditionally beneficial” (p. 694, 1996); while Mizruchi believes that the extent to 
which social connections matter varies according to circumstances (1996).  Both 
acknowledge that something external to social relations is moderating how social 
relations affect performances. The influences might be as simple as which persons are 
involved in the exchange (Uzzi 2004) or something as complex as the level of uncertainty 
surrounding the actors and situations (Rogers 1962; Kerckhoff, Back et al. 1965; 
Mizruchi 1996; Simpson and McGrimmon 2008).  
  
Revisiting the contradiction in the Burt (1992) and Ostrom (1990) findings, the need for 
considering environmental influences becomes clearer.  The paradox of their arguments, 
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Burt arguing in favor of large networks and Ostrom in favor of small networks, supports 
the idea that exogenous factors exert their influence on the social/economic relationship, 
and need to be considered.  It is not universally true that either large or small networks 
have the greater influence.  Instead, the influence of network size is effected by  
environmental factors (Perry, Segunda 2004). 
 
Rowley, et.al agree that environmental characteristics affect the direction and degree of 
influence that embedded ties have on performances.  For example, the researchers found 
that the industry type influences the impact that tie strength has on performances. In the 
steel industry, strong ties are related to positive performances. While in the 
semiconductor industry weak ties are positively associated with successful performances. 
Whether the tie connects similar or different actors also matters. In a study of 
publications performances between teams composed of either heterogeneous or 
homogenous researchers, Porac, Fischer, et.al (2004) found that both heterogeneous and 
homogenous alliances increase publication performances, but alliances formed by 
researchers from different universities, with different backgrounds and disciplines 
published at higher rates than teams whose composition were more homogeneous.  
Reagans and McEvily (2003) reported similar findings on the relationship between 
heterogeneous ties and performances.   While studying knowledge transfer processes the 
authors found that having relations with a diverse group of people allows for more 
effective communication to heterogeneous groups.  The knowledge transfer process is 
improved by having a diverse range on inputs, and being able to absorb diverse inputs 
allows for more effective expression of outputs. 
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Similarly, the age of the relations influences how social relations affect performances.  
Social ties within a young or emerging network of ties tend to be stronger, while older, 
more mature networks consist of weak ties.  The same is true based on the age of the 
market in which firms operate.  Emerging markets are organized around strong ties; 
mature markets around weak ties.  This pattern of using strong or weak ties reflects what 
is needed in the market.  Young firms need the security and stability of strong ties to 
survive, while older firms need access to new ideas and knowledge to continue (Elfring 
and Hulsink 2003; Elango and Pattnaik 2007; Elfring and Hulsink 2007).  The issue of 
age is also reflected when length of the relations is considered. Hwang points out that 
successfully managing cooperative relationships hinges on understanding both 
interpersonal and intertemporal dynamics; one is not to be explained without 
consideration of the other (2005).  This is an important point because the nature of 
relations as well as its impact on performance is expected to change over time.  Over time 
as more and more relations are added, the marginal improvement decreases and the 
ability to nurture strong ties decreases (McFayden and Cannella Jr. 2004).  The point to 
consider here is that strong relations can become weak ones over time, so it is best to 
understand that the relations are dynamic and so is the impact they have on performances.  
Rutten (2004) reinforces this view, but goes further by stating that the temporal aspect is 
not the key.  Instead, Rutten argues that it is not the length of the relation, but what 
happens in the relation that impacts performances.  This argument parallels the network 
size debate as both argue that the stated characteristic, network size or longevity, is not 
the influencing characteristic.  In the case of time, it is assumed that longer relationships 
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deliver greater access to resources or improved absorptive capacity.  Rutten argues that 
neither is necessarily true.  One may have less productive long lasting relations or highly 
productive relations with a short life span. 
 
Geography and culture are other environmental contexts that significantly shape the 
interaction between social relations and performances.   Piore and Sable point to small 
regional socioeconomic networks as models of success. The success of these small, 
closely knit and geographically based networks is argued to be derived from their ability 
to operate with production flexibility and the competitive advantage derived from 
exploiting unique regional strengths (Piore and Sable 1984; Scott 1986; Porter 1990).  
The advantage of geographically based social relations is derived from shared culture, 
language and business practices, which create an unforced ease in economic exchange. 
 
Specific characteristics of local geography also impact social relations in other ways.  For 
example, the number of in-migrants into the area influences how social relations impact 
performances.  Areas with more in-migration tend to benefit from exposure to new ideas 
introduced by new residents, while areas with little in-migration  have little access to new 
information and tend to suffer less successful performances (Atterton, 2007).  Other 
studies confirm that “place matters” in determining how ties are embedded in a network 
structure and what performances are to be expected (Neal, 2008; Floysand and Sjohotl, 
2007).  Franklin and Lee (2007) explain the relationship between geography and culture 
on economic performances in this manner; cultural embeddedness leads to structural 
embeddedness, which then shapes economic relations.  Specifically, Franklin and Lee 
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find that ties embedded in a sense of place and belonging can have more influence on 
economic performances than how ties are embedded in a network structure. Franklin and 
Lee would argue that Kansas City’s Gates Barbeque Sauce continues to thrive in Kansas 
City despite the availability of Kraft and Heinz products because the Gates’ franchise is 
culturally and geographically embedded in the region.  Atlanta’s music industry grows as 
artists flock to the area in hopes of taking advantage of knowledge diffusion from the 
number of talented industry producers, writers and promoter who call the city home.  
 
 Singh (2005) examined the interplay between geography, culture and knowledge 
diffusion and found that each plays a role in influencing economic performances.  Sing 
analyzed different patterns of knowledge diffusion among firms and found a link between 
knowledge flows and geography.  Sing found that knowledge flows within a region were 
greater than knowledge flows which crossed regions, partially because interregional 
knowledge flows moved on long geodesics, e.g. long paths through the network of 
relations, while intraregional knowledge flowed on shorter geodesics.  Singh’s work 
indicates that ties between actors in close geographical proximity operate as information 
superhighways that create a competitive advantage.   
 
Summary of Literature Review 
The logic model of this research draws from a diverse group of theories to explain public 
contracting performance and performance measurement.  Some of the logic comes from 
socio-economic theory, some from economic theory. Even legal theory makes a 
contribution.  We are able to use all of these diverse approaches because they offer 
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something worthwhile individually and collectively. Although they conflict on some 
points, they do not conflict on all points. 
 
Though diverse, there are similarities in the theories that help in the research design.  For 
example, there is a fairly consistent plea to base our explanation on observed behavior. 
When we consider which factors should be examined when we study performance, we 
are directed to measure factors that have been observed influencing performance. We are 
informed that it is important to understand that when economic activity is observed, it is 
influenced by the social structure in which it is embedded.  Even the economists say that 
we should consider factors that reflect reality.  These different theories insist that logic 
models be based on what is observed, not what is theorized. 
 
Likewise the importance of staying focused on the particulars of the phenomena being 
examined is stressed in several of the theories. We are to choose performance 
measurement factors uniquely suited for the particular situation. We are to consider 
social, political and economic influences.  Along that same line, we are to use multiple 
criteria to define performance. We are not to simply transfer a set of measures from one 
organization to another. The most serious critique of TCE, the prevailing explanation of 
contracting is that it is not effective in the public sector because it does not recognize 
variables that are unique to public contracting. The theories are different but they still 
agree that however factors influencing performance are conceptualized, they need to 
reflect the unique realities of the organization.  
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Finally, the theories agree on the importance of environmental influences. We expect 
performance in public organizations to have some influences that aren’t significant in the 
private sector. We expect that strong ties will perform well in some circumstances, while 
weak ties perform well in others. The reviewed literatures support understanding 
performance from different vantage points, and the need to consider it with respect to 
environment context is consistent.  There has to be some accounting for environmental 
factors such as age or geography. Age, though an indicator of firm survival, is also an 
indicator of organizational capacity. Long surviving firms have the capacity to 
successfully and consistently perform in the market.  Similarly although location 
addresses the geographical environment, it can also impact the intensity and frequency of 
social relations and influence performance.  
  
Overall, the various theories support a new conceptual model for understanding the 
factors that influence public contracting performance and performance measurement.  
The new concept combines TCE propositions of organizational capacity with 
embeddedness arguments of social relations capacity.   Performance can be modeled as 
the combination of an organization’s capacity to effectively and efficiently execute a 
contract combined with an organization’s ability to access and absorb resources made 
available through social relations.   
 
Gaps in the Literature 
The theories used in the research provide a broad base for explaining public contracting 
performance. The performance measurement literature discusses the importance of 
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having practical, relevant tools for measuring performance. Contracting literature 
contrasts the differences between contracting in public and private sector environments.  
Along with these studies is   a sizable reserve of research that investigates relationships 
between embedded social relations and economic performances. Topics include buyer-
supplier ties (Wynarczyk and Watson, 2005), firm to firm alliances (Bell and Zaheer, 
2007; Bonner, Kim and Cavusgil, 2005), entrepreneurs, small businesses and new 
businesses (Jack, Dodd and Anderson, 2008; Elfring and Hulsink, 2007, Edward, Ram, 
Sen Gupta and Tsai, 2006), and  innovation and knowledge transfer (Venkatramna and 
Lee, 2004; Bonner and Walker, 2004).  Studies using embeddedness or network 
propositions to examine phenomena discuss managing inter-organizational networks 
between public and not for profit organizations (Isett and Provan, 2005; Provan and 
Milward, 1995; Provan, Milward and Isett, 2002) or dilemmas in coordinating networked 
resources (Herranz, 2007; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; O’Toole, 1997).  
 
 The theories used in this research comment on a wide range of topics. At times two 
might comment on the same topic without referencing each other. For example, 
performance measurement theory discusses the need to find all factors that influence 
outcomes and does so without referencing embeddedness claims that tie strength is a 
factor of performance. New Institutional Economics and legal theories both comment on 
the need to consider the impact of social factors on performance, without pointing out the 
parallels in their propositions.  This research addresses a gap in the literature that stems 
from theorists not issuing joint statements. The gap is not caused by a lack of comment 
on public contracting or performance measurement. Nor is it caused by a lack of 
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comment on the role of social relations play in economic outcomes or the impact of tie 
strengths.  The gap occurs because there is no joint theoretical statement on the influence 
social relations exert on public contracting performance and performance measurement. 
The analysis that follows is designed to address questions left unanswered in the 
literature, and is guided by two separate research questions and hypotheses. The first 
question addresses the impact of a prime contractor’s arrangements of social ties with its 




Research Question One 
 
In a public contracting environment, does the strength of relations between a prime 
contractor and its subcontractors improve performance management scores? 
 
Drawing from the Uzzi study of the relationship between firm survival and social 
relations, this question will be explored by examining the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 : Performance evaluation scores are positively associated with socially 
embedded business ties between a prime contractor and its subcontractors. 
  
 
The second research question addresses the impact of having a public manager evaluate 
the same private firm peer on multiple occasions: 
 
Research Question Two 
 
Do social relations between a public manager evaluator and the private firm peer being 
evaluated influence performance scores? 
 
H2:  Higher performance scores are achieved when the public manager evaluator 




DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
 
 
This study explores whether social relations between actors influence performance 
evaluation scores.  Social relations, or ties, are examined on two levels.  Relations 
between organizations are modeled using ties between private firms, which serve as 
prime contractors or subcontractors on GDOT contracts. Relations between individuals 
are modeled using ties between GDOT project managers and the private firm managers, 
who oversee performance on GDOT contracts.  Typically studies that examine the 
arrangement of social relations between actors are considered network studies.  As such, 
it is common to collect data using survey and field research techniques.   There are, 
however, instances where the advantages of archival data are preferred.   This study uses 
GDOT contract and performance evaluation records, which offer the benefit of formal 
documentation of relations, as opposed to relying on individuals’ recall. Additionally, the 
data reports the frequency of relations on two levels.  It first reports the frequency of 
interaction between prime contractors and subcontractors. It also captures the frequency 
of relations between GDOT project managers and the private firm project managers 
overseeing the work being evaluated.  As is common with archival data, the data were not 
specifically collected to support external research.  Its collection was designed to meet 
internal information needs.  Consequently there maybe a number of interesting and 
helpful questions that this analysis will raise but which will remain unanswered simply 
because the archival data was not collected with such questions in mind.  Instead the data 





Until the 1990s, GDOT’s in-house engineers handled the GDOT’s need for engineering 
design work.  The work was executed through departments such as Bridge Design, Road 
Design, Urban Projects Design as well as district transportation offices.  However, two 
important environmental changes dictated adjustments in GDOT’s approach to the 
engineering design function. First, GDOT’s labor market changed due to private firms 
hiring GDOT engineers and the retiring of veteran employees.  This change was 
accompanied by political changes, which called for increased privatization of 
nonessential government functions.  Adjusting to the new environmental realities 
required modification in the allocation of work between private firms and GDOT.  The 
balance of engineering design work shifted from internal production to external 
production.  Engineering design work once performed by GDOT engineers was 
contracted out to private engineering design firms (Kingsley, Gen et al. 2003).  
 
As GDOT contracted out more of its engineering design work, the role of GDOT 
engineers changed from executing engineering design work to managing and 
coordinating relations between GDOT and private firms.  Due to this shift in 
responsibilities, GDOT administrators moved the oversight and evaluation functions out 
of individual departments and into a new office, the Office of Consultant Design (OCD).    
The data used in this study are from the Office of Consultant Design, which oversees the 
majority of GDOT’s contracts for engineering design.  The data are largely representative 
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of such contract work although the full scope of contracts executed out of GDOT offices 
is much wider. 
 
The type of contracts executed by the Office of Consultant Design (OCD) cover a wide 
range of activity and complexity.  For example, contracts from the Roads Department 
include such projects as a three-year contract to build a welcome center and a one year 
contract to produce a “Development of Drainage Manual.”  Projects formerly managed 
by the Urban Department but now managed by OCD include a nine-year contract for 
work on high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes on Interstate 85. It is not uncommon for 
OCD to award turnkey contracts, which means that the prime contractor has the 
responsibility for the entire project from beginning to end.  Projects of this type can be 
very complex undertakings and can include functions ranging from developing concepts 
and designs to completing bridge replacements.  At the same time the description of some 
contracts prevents understanding the degree of relative complexity involved.  For 
example there are contracts that are formally described as “deck rehab”, “County Line to 
Scott Rd.” or  “Archeology Mitigation.”  These descriptions defy categorizing work as 
relatively complex or simple.  The ability to determine complexity is further compounded 
when they are awarded to large, international firms that have the capacity to execute even 
complex contracts in-house or with assistance from few subcontractors. 
 
Data Sources 
Consultant Management System 
The creation of the new office also required transfer of data collection responsibility to 
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OCD, creating a challenge of combining data collection systems that shared little 
consistency.   In response to this challenge, GDOT created the Consultant Management 
System (CMS). CMS was an early attempt to standardize data collection and progress 
reporting.   GDOT employees believe that during the data transfer from individual 
departments to CMS, records of some contracts were lost.   Records of contracts 
completed prior to the data transfer were intentionally not transferred.  Also, because 
different departments collected different data, OCD decided which data were important 
as they moved forward, and some information previously collected by departments was 
determined less important and not transferred to the CMS database.  The final data fields 
used in CMS collected information on each engineering design project including contract 
descriptions, contract amount, project locations and, important for this study, data on 
firms acting as prime contractors or subcontractors. 
 
The CMS database represents one of the first attempts at unifying GDOT engineering 
design data, previously housed in different systems.  Information in the CMS database is 
compiled in numerous tables. The CMS data used in this study was obtained primarily 
from the Project Information and Subfinal tables.   These tables provided information on 
projects initiated between 1992-2004 and were heavily relied on in constructing the 
independent variables, particularly the variables of interest, which model relations 
associated with the contracting process.   
 
Consultant Management Information System 
The second data source used in this study was the Consultant Management Information 
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System (CMIS), an improved version of the older CMS database. CMIS was created to 
provide enhanced managing and tracking capability for OCD project managers. CMIS 
data combines records of projects initially collected in the CMS database with records on 
newer projects. However, similar to the creation of CMS, records on completed projects 
were not transferred.  Only historical records related to projects still in progress or those 
scheduled to begin were transferred from CMS into CMIS.  In total CMIS maintained 
365 records in the “CMIS_Contract” table, of which 119 were transferred from the CMS 
database.  
 
Performance Evaluation Database 
The third data source is the separately maintained records of performance evaluation. 
Performance evaluations are completed for projects exceeding 12 months duration.  The 
evaluations occur once during each year of the project and have a final evaluation upon 




The data were cleaned with the end goal of creating a sample where there was contract 
data for each evaluation and an evaluation for each contract.  Cleaning the data required 
multiple steps to eliminate duplicate and incomplete records and to eliminate those 
records where there was not a matched pair of contract detail and performance 
evaluation.  When combining records from both CMS and CMIS, I organized contracts 
from both CMS and CMIS databases numerically and removed duplicates and records 
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without a project identification number.   At this point, subcontractors and primes were 
matched when their names appeared on the same project number. For the CMS data, 
details on which subcontractors worked on projects were recorded in a separate Subfinal 
table.  Finally observations indicating no use of  subcontractors on the contract, either 
because of incomplete records or because of the nature of the contract did not require 
subcontractors, were removed.  These observations were removed because formal 
documentation of relations between a prime contractor and a subcontractor were needed 
to construct one of the variables of interest. 
 
The evaluations data were cleaned separately from the project information data.  The 
evaluation database contained evaluations from multiple GDOT departments.  As 
previously mentioned, the focus of this research are the relations between participants on 
contacts managed by, OCD, which is only one of many GDOT departments.  Evaluations 
detailing performance on contracts managed by other GDOT departments were removed 
because they did not have general project information recorded in either CMS or CMIS, 
the contract databases for OCD projects.   
 
Because  OCD projects often cover multiple contract years, it is not uncommon to find 
one project with multiple evaluations.  For example, if a project began in 2000 and 
concluded in 2004, it might have four annual evaluations in the database. When it was 
noted that multiple evaluations for a project were recorded and that the evaluations scores 
were the same or very similar, for example scores of 3.4, 3.4, 3.3 and 3.4, only the final 
evaluation was included in the sample data.  If, however, multiple evaluations of the 
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same project were in the database and there was a change in either the project manager 
performing the evaluation or the project manager whose work was being evaluated, or if 
there were significant changes in period to period evaluation scores, exceptions were 
made as the presence of a different project manager pairing indicated the presence of 
different relations to be evaluated.  At the end of the data cleaning, there were 122 
evaluations matched to projects recorded in the cleaned contract data set. These are the 
observations used in the study. 
 
Description of the Data 
Each observation used in the research has two components;  an evaluation of a prime 
contractor’s performance and records of embedded relations involving GDOT project 
managers, private firm project managers, and prime consultant and sub-consultant firms . 
Thirty-five different firms are represented in the sample set, with several firms evaluated 
multiple times, because of the number of projects they worked on and the different 
pairing of personnel they created.  The four most frequently evaluated firms represent 
thirty-four different observations and account for over thirty-five percent of all 
observations in the sample.   To note, these firms used several different individuals to 
work with GDOT, so although the firm is appearing multiple times, their personnel is 











Twenty-four different GDOT project managers completed the sample set evaluations.  
These twenty-four managers evaluated the work of seventy-two different consultant 
project managers; however, similar to overrepresentation from private firms, several 
GDOT project managers are overrepresented in the sample observations.  Recorded 
evaluations from five GDOT project managers are disproportionately represented in the 
data and account for sixty-eight percent of all evaluations. For example, Project Manager 
16 accounts for over one-fifth of all evaluations and Project Manager 13 accounts for 
another fifteen percent. As a group, however, the average total weighted performance 
Firm Name #  Evaluations in 
Sample 
# Different Projects # Different Project 
Managers 
Arcadis 10 8 5 
Heath 10 7 7 
Kimley Horn 10 9 5 
PBQD 13 10 6 
Most Frequent Total 43 34 23 
Total Sample Observations 122 96 72 
% Total Sample 
Observations 
35.2 35.4 34.3 
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evaluation scores awarded by these five project managers are not biased towards higher 
or lower scores.  Three of the project managers; Project Manager 7, Project Manager 13, 
and Project Manager 15, award scores that on average are lower than the sample mean of 
3.69, while the two other project managers; Project Manager 16 and Project Manager 20 
awarded scores higher than the sample mean (Table 3.2).  The overrepresentation of five 
project managers’ evaluation is noted, but does not create great concern because 
collectively they do not introduce significant bias into the sample data. 
 









7 17 13.93 13.93 3.45 
13 18 14.75 28.68 3.33 
15 10 8.20 36.88 3.23 
16 26 21.31 58.19 3.80 
20 12 9.84 68.03 3.92 
Total 83 68.03 68.03 3.69 
 
Eighty-seven percent of the sample evaluations are for projects recorded as managed by 
the Office of Consultant Design (OCD). The remaining thirteen percent are recorded as 
managed by either  Utilities, Urban Design, Road Design or various GDOT District 
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Offices.  Sixty-three (52%) of the observations are first evaluations of projects. The 
remaining are second or third evaluations of existing projects.  As stated in the discussion 
on cleaning the data, multiple evaluations of the same project were included only if there 
were changes in the private firm project manager or GDOT project manager assigned to 
the contract or if scores changed significantly from period to period.  The majority, (92%) 
of the evaluations are annual rather than final evaluations, and the firms evaluated are 
prime contractors.  The sample includes evaluations for years between 2000 and 2006.  
As with the firms evaluated and the project managers performing evaluations, there is 
overrepresentation in time periods.   The early years have fewer evaluations, while the 
last two years in the study account for over eighty percent of sample observations, as 
shown in (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3     Evaluation Dates 
 
Evaluation Date Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 2002 5 4.10 4.10 
2003 14 11.48 15.57 
2004 3 2.46 18.03 
2005 42 34.43 52.46 
2006 58 47.54 100.00 






The research model is designed to model performance measurement as an outcome of 
relations occurring between parties involved in the contracting process.  The model 
conceptualizes two different types of relations as key influences on performance scores; 
the relations between the team of private firms executing the contract and relations 
between the private firm project manager and the GDOT manager evaluating the work.  
The models does not seek to include all sociological and economic variables which 
contribute to  performance scores, but it does control for arguments that place matters and 
organizational capacity matters (Uzzi 1996).   
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, total weighted score, is drawn from GDOT’s formal 
performance measurement documentation.  As such, it is the practical tool used to meet 
the practical information needs of GDOT managers, elected officials and citizen 
stakeholders.  The performance measurement instrument is designed with input from 
GDOT managers and reflects their superior knowledge and familiarity into the best way 
to measure performance of activity.  Its design acknowledges that performance 
measurement of services, where it is difficult to measure outcomes, requires more than 
evaluating financial ratios.  Instead it reviews a comprehensive review of multiple goals 
and objectives.  
 
This conceptualization differs from dependent variables found in other studies examining 
the relationship between social relations and outcomes from economic activity.  Such 
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studies have used dependent variables such as fees charged, firm cost savings, jobs 
created, revenue generated, taxes cut or other economic terms (Domberger and Hensher 
1993; Domberger and Jensen 1997; Boyne 1998; Boyne 1998; Hodge 1998; Hodge 2000; 
Van Slyke 2003; Brown and Potoski 2004; Bennett and Iossa 2006).   
 
Rather than use financial ratios, GDOT project managers evaluate performance 
addressing five distinct areas of importance.  After evaluation of all areas the project 
managers award a total score, based on their evaluation of contract performance in: 
Management, Prosecution, Quality, Adequacy and Cooperation.  The scoring rubric 
allows for each category to be rated a whole number ranging from a minimum of 1 point 
to a maximum of 5 points.  After the base score is awarded in each category, they are 
then weighted based on the established level of importance. The sum of weighted scores 
from all of the five categories is used to create the study’s dependent variable.   
 
According to GDOT evaluation documents, total weighted scores are based on the inputs 










 Figure 3.1   Performance Score Inputs 
.                        
 
 
Each input is specifically targeted to measure an aspect of project progress, which GDOT 
considers essential.  Additionally, GDOT delineates detailed and specific behaviors 
project managers are to consider when evaluating performance.  These behaviors are 
explained as follows: 
Management 
 The management score reflects how well the private firm understands and 
effectively manages the project contract.  The score awarded considers but is not limited 
to the following:  Accomplishes the intent and scope of the contracted services by 
managing appropriate documentation, Minimizes the involvement of DOT staff in the 
management of the consultant and subconsultant staff, Maintains appropriate cost 





















 The mean weighted management score is .92.  Performances on this factor were 
primarily assigned weighted values of .75  or 1.0, close to the mean, while thirteen 
percent of scores fell into one of the two tails.   The variable’s normality is confirmed by 
results from the Shapiro-Wilks test, which report at W-statistic of .99 with a 1.00 
probability score.  These indicate that, given our sample size, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the variable is normally distributed. 
 
Prosecution and Progress 
 Prosecution and Progress measures how well the evaluated firm stays on schedule and 
accomplishes established milestones and completion dates.  This area also captures how 
well the private firm adjusts resources in response to demands of the project delivery 
schedule.  Additionally, Prosecution and Progress evaluates whether the firm provides 
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timely completion of tasks, including reviews, revisions, intermediate and final 
deliverables.  Because this area specifically addresses the issue of how well the contractor 
adjusts resources to changing conditions, it is expected to be influenced by the quality of 
communications between GDOT and the firm, and consequently the relationship between 
the two project managers.  It is also expected that this evaluation category captures the 
give and take of  contractual relationships built on incomplete contracts.  Scores in 
Prosecution and Progress are weighted .25, which indicates that GDOT finds this area 
equally important to Management.   
 




As shown in Graph 3.2, the weighted mean of .92 in this area is comparable to that for 
Management.  Results from the Shapiro-Wilks test report a W-test statistic of .99 with a 
probability score of .94, which indicates that we cannot reject the hull hypothesis that the 
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distribution is normal. 
 
Quality of Work 
The Quality of Work evaluates whether the private firm consistently meets the 
Department’s quality expectations and exercises quality control measures.  It also 
evaluates how the private firm applies the Department’s established guidelines, standards 
and procedures, design policies, studies, reports, test, calculations and /or other available 
information to produce accurate and technically correct design plans, reports, documents, 
studies tests and or other specified deliverables to the Department.  This area is given one 






The distribution of scores is presented in Graph 3.3, and indicates that the scores are 
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normally distributed around the mean of .365.  Normal distribution is further  indicated 
by the Shapiro-Wilks W-test statistic of 1.0 and related p-value of 1.0.  These test results 
indicate that we cannot reject the null that the  sample data was drawn from a normal 
distribution. 
Cooperation/ Coordination 
The Cooperation/Coordination category evaluates whether the private firm works 
cooperatively with DOT staff, other consultants, local state and federal agencies, utility 
companies and/or citizen stakeholders. It also evaluates whether the firm proactively 
coordinates all activities that may impact or interface with the project and communicates 
issues and information effectively.  The firm is also evaluated on how it responds to the 
demands of the project, actively defines problems, suggests alternatives and recommends 
solutions.  The importance of this factor is reflected in its assigned weight of .30, the 
heaviest weight assigned to any of the five evaluation areas. 
  




 As shown in Graph 3.4, the mean score in this category is 1.2.  An observation of the, the 
distribution appears to be somewhat skewed to the left, lower values with a normal 
distribution, based on the p-value of .21 and the Shapiro-Wilks W-test statistic of .99, 
which indicates that given the sample size, the null hypothesis that the sample was drawn 
from a normal distribution cannot be rejected. 
 
Adequacy/ Availability of Work Force 
The final area evaluates whether the firm possesses and maintains adequate resources to 
meet the demands of the contract, including having sufficient numbers of qualified staff, 
who are properly equipped and available for the required tasks.  Similar to the Quality 
rating, Adequacy is assigned a lesser role, given an importance weighting of .10.    
 





The data for this category are normally distributed around the mean of .359, as presented 
in Graph 3.5, and indicated by the Shapiro-Wilks W-test statistic of .997 and probability 
value of 1.0, which indicates that  given our sample size we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution of the data. 
Total Rating 
The total weighted average score, which is the dependent variable for the study, is 
compiled by summing the individual weighted scores for each of the five rating 
categories.  The mean score in the sample data is 3.39, with a minimum value of 2.4 and 
a maximum value of 5.0.   
 
 
Table 3.4    Scoring Frequency 
Total Weighted Score Percent Cumulative 
0.0-2.99 6.56 6.56 
3.00-3.99 52.46 59.02 
4.00-4.99 38.52 97.54 
5.00 2.46 100.00 
 
Performances in three observations were awarded perfect scores, with the score of 4.0 
being  awarded twenty-seven times.  Ninety percent of total scores were between 3.0 and 
4.0.  Less than seven percent of all scores were less than 3.0, and only two and one half 
percent of scores were perfect (Table 3.4). 
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Graph 3.6  Weighted Total Scores Histogram 
 
 
As indicated in Graph 3.6, the weighted total scores are normally distributed around the 
mean, with a Shapiro-Wilks W-test statistic of .995 and a probability value of .960, which 




Correlation between Five Scoring Categories 
The information provided by the five ratings category indicates that each is measuring a 
unique aspect of performance.  Correlation levels between the five categories are within 
an acceptable range (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5    Correlations between Scoring Categories 
 
Factor Management Prosecution Quality Cooperation Adequacy Total 
       
Management 1.0000      
Prosecution 0.5142 1.0000     
Quality 0.5914 0.4093 1.0000    
Cooperation 0.4914 0.5449 0.4909 1.0000   
Adequacy 0.6032 0.5310 0.5539 .5278 1.0000  
Total Score 0.8121 0.7619 0.7761 .7698 0.8189 1.0000 
 
As expected, there is high positive correlation between the total weighted score and each 
of the five categories contributing to the total.   Management and Adequacy both have 
correlations with total scores that exceed .80.  The remaining three rating categories have 
correlations with total scores that are greater than .75.   
 
The relationships between individual categories, however, are not at a magnitude such 
that concern for multicollinearity is created.   Adequacy, which has a .10 importance 
weight, is highly correlated with Management (.60) and Quality, which also has a low 
importance weight (.10) and has one of the higher correlations with Management (.59). 
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Given the low level of importance that Adequacy and Quality are assigned,  higher 
correlation with Management is not expected to bias the role of Management in the 
dependent variable.   
 
It is noted, however, that the combination of Management’s .60 correlation with 
Adequacy, combined with a .59 correlation with the Quality rating indicates that all three 
categories are measuring some of the same performance characteristics.  Overall, the 
levels of correlation between the ratings categories are acceptable and provide comfort 
that the performance evaluations are capturing different aspects of contract performance 
and not repeatedly measuring the same performance characteristic.     
 
Independent Variables 
The Social Relations Variables 
The social relations variables are the variables of interest in the study. The first of two 
social relations variables is designed to model the strength of tie between a prime 
contractor and its subcontractors, engaged on a contract. This variable gives insight into 
the impact of relations between parties who actually execute a portion of the work.  The 
construction of the variable draws from embeddedness theory, specifically arguing that 
performance is influenced by the strength of social ties between actors.  Drawing from 
Uzzi (1996), the strength of tie variable is assigned the variable name, first order 
coupling.  The variable is included in both linear and squared terms so that it can model a 
curvilinear relationship between tie strength and performance.  Modeling the relationship 
between strength of tie and performance as curvilinear allows for expressing performance 
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as positively associated both weak and strong ties, given both relationships are argued in 
embeddedness literature.  Although some arguments have established a relationship 
between weak ties and positive outcomes (Granovetter 1973; Cooper 2003; Atterton 
2007) and others have established a relationship between strong ties and positive 
outcomes (Cooper 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Storper 2006), I expect the strong ties 
benefits of increased trust and improved communication flows to positively impact 
outcomes  in public contracting environment. The weak tie argument that success comes 
from access to multiple streams of information (Granovetter 1973; Krippner, Granovetter 
et al. 2004), can also be expected to exert some influence on outcomes, but I expect that 
the influence of access to multiple streams of information will be dampened by a 
structure where a prime contractor dictates the actions of other members.    Given that 
public contracting involves long term commitments from a specific group of actors, we 
believe that success will be associated with actors’ ability to trust, communicate and 
adjust to changes.  These benefits are found in strong ties, more so than weak ties. 
The first social relations variables, first order coupling and its squared term, examines 
embedded relations between prime contractors and their subcontractors.  These relations 
are necessitated by the nature of work covered under the contracts.  The complex work 
detailed in GDOT engineering and design contracts often exceed the scope of most 
contractors’ internal capacity. Work that must be executed can include diverse functions 
such as land and right of way acquisition, aerial mapping, surveying and construction.  
Such broad scope requires the prime contactor to fashion a network of firms so that the 
contract can be completed. 
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Embedded relations between  prime contractors and their network of subcontractors were 
quantified following Uzzi’s concentration of relations concept, which identifies  a  
“ special relationship” between firms by finding where firms concentrate transactions 
with a few trading partners (1996).  Higher values indicate the prime contractor 
concentrates work among fewer subconsultants and forms a special relationship, while 
lower values indicate the prime contractor disperses work among a larger group of 
subconsultants and maintains a pattern of short lived, episodic and random relations, 
relations which are transactional and not socially embedded  (Williamson 1985; Baker 
1990). 
 
Measures of concentration between exchange partners, such as first-order network 
coupling, are accepted as valid and reliable approaches for identifying the presence of 
embedded relations and determining the impact embedded relations have on 
performances in part because of their “face validity ”.  In ethnographic studies of 
exchange partners, actors reported that decisions to concentrate or disperse exchange was 
socially influenced.   Additionally, Uzzi (1996) argues that the concept of concentrated 
exchange reflecting special relationships is verified through interviews with people who 
fundamentally understand the nature of prime/subcontractor type relationships. 
 
 In a study of the New York garment industry, Uzzi found that interviewees believed the 
degree of concentration of work between a manufacturer and contractors was indicative 
of “special relationships” which impact performances (1996). A similar verification was 
found through interviews with GDOT personnel.  Interviewees at OCD indicated that 
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they expected to see special relations where prime contractors form relations with 
particular subcontractors over time.  OCD officials also expressed belief that these 
relationships lead to better performances.  OCD personnel indicated that these special 
relationships and the associated frequent participation in exchange are used to inform 
GDOT that particular networks are healthy, in good condition and capable of producing 
high quality performances, “These niches help consultants work together.  It also sends 
clear signals to GDOT about the soundness of consultant teams” (Weible 2007).  A 
GDOT contract specialist also emphasized a belief that special relations between prime 
and subcontractors are important to performances by stating that in the selection process, 
“we approve a team, not a prime contractor” (Weible, 2007). 
 
In addition to face validity, network coupling variables have empirical validity.  Previous 
studies provide evidence that the level of trade concentration between parties indicates 
social embeddedness and also that levels of concentration in embedded ties impact the 
quality of performances. Network coupling variables have been successfully used to 
identify the connection between social relations and performances in investment banking 
and manufacturing industries (Baker 1990; Uzzi 1996).  In analyzing the relationship 
between social relations and performances in the garment industry, Uzzi used network 
coupling variables and found embedded relations played a significant role in determining 
survival rates among firms working as subcontractors to clothing manufactures. Baker 
(1990) using coupling variables, found the pattern of ties between investment banks and 
their corporate clients influenced the total dollars raised and the total number of deals 
done.   
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These findings support arguments that market relations are not independent of social 
influences but are socially structured (Baker 1984; Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Etzioni 
1988).  Variables which operationalized concentration of social factors have also been 
used in industrial organizational economics and inter-organizational behavior studies in 
the private market (Scherer 1980; Baker 1990).   In studies of private sector market 
activity, expressing social relations in terms of concentration have proved helpful.  
It is expected that in a study of public sector market activity, this approach will also 






As in studies of the private sector, the relationship between embedded social relations and 
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performance in the public sector is not expected to be linear.  Instead, the relationship is 
expected to be generally positive.  At some point, however, the maximum benefit of 
concentrating relations will be achieved and any higher degrees of concentration will lead 
to lower performance performances.  A review of a scatterplot of first order coupling 
levels on total weighted scores confirms a curvilinear relationship and indicates that 
concentration levels lower than .20 are positively associated with higher scores, but levels 
greater than .20 are negatively associated with higher scores.  The negative relationship 
continues until the level of concentration exceeds .5.    Above the .5 level the relationship 
between first order coupling scores and performance scores again turn positive (Graph 
3.7).   Modeling this relationship requires the introduction of a quadratic term; the first 
order coupling variable will appear in the model in both linear and squared terms. 
 
Records from the CMS and CMIS databases were used to create the first order network 
coupling variable. The variable was computed individually for each member of the prime 
contractor’s network, that worked on a particular contract.  The concentration of relations 
between members of the network and the prime contractor was calculated for each 
contract team and reflects the cumulative efforts between a prime contractor and a 
subcontractor on OCD projects.   The coupling variable captures  joint efforts between 
the prime contractor and a team of subcontractors, occurring between 1992 and date of 
the performance evaluation.   
 
As demonstration of the computation, in Table 3.6 prime contractor A and prime 
contractor B are each awarded three contracts.  Each prime contractor decides how it will 
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engage its network of subcontracting firms, and create subcontracting opportunities. The 
prime contractor has a range of options for apportioning work between its own staff and 
subcontracting firms. Prime Contract A creates three teams, repeatedly using a 
configuration of the same three subcontractor firms.  Prime A assigns work in the 
following manner; Subcontractor 1 works on two contracts; Subcontractor 2 works on 
one contract; and Subcontractor 3 is used on all three contracts.  In total, Prime 
Contractor A creates six subcontracting opportunities.  
 
In contrast, Prime Contractor B also has three contracts, but uses a much larger network 
of subcontractor firms to create its teams.  Prime B’s market interaction with 
subcontracting firms creates opportunities for ten different subcontractors.   No single 
subcontracting firm is paired with Prime B more than 18.8% of the time. 
Table 3.6 
Example of First Order Coupling Computation 
 
Prime Contractor A 
(3 contracts) 
     Prime Contractor B 
(3 Contracts) 
  
 b b/c (b/c)2   b b/c (b/c)2 
Available Subs Times 
Used 








Sub 1 2 .33 .11   2 .125 .012 
Sub 2 1 .167 .03   2 .125 .012 
Sub 3 3 .5 .25   3 .188 .035 
Sub 4 - - -   3 .188 .035 
Sub 5 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
Sub 6 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
Sub 7 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
Sub 8 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
Sub 9 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
Sub 10 - - -   1 .0625 .004 
#Opportunities  Prime 
Creates for Subs (c) 
 
6     16   
1st OrderCoupling 
Score 
  .389     .117 
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The contrast in the example above demonstrates how a first order coupling measure of 
embeddedness is constructed and how it is influenced by a prime contractor’s decision 
making. Both prime contractors have three contracts, which may be used to create 
opportunities for subcontractors.  Prime A decides to restrict opportunities to three firms, 
while Prime B enters the market and forms relations with ten firms.  This decision 
making results in first order coupling factors of .389 and .117 for Prime A and Prime B 
respectively.   
 To further explain the concept, note the treatment of Subcontractor 3. Prime B created 
three opportunities for Subcontractors 3 and Prime A created three opportunities for 
Subcontractor 3, however, they represent very different relations with the prime 
contractor.  Three contracts with Prime A represents fifty percent of all opportunities 
created, which suggests stronger ties and more socially embedded relations.  On the other 
hand, three contracts with Prime B represent nineteen percent (.188) of all the 
opportunity Prime B created, indicating a more arms length relationship between the 
prime and its subcontractors.  
 
Continuing with the example, Prime A shows two forms of decision making that lead to 
higher first order coupling scores.  First Prime A used a small number of subcontractors   
( intensity) and second, Prime A used Subcontractor 3 repeatedly (frequency).  Either 
frequency or intensity can create socially embedded relations; and regardless of whether 
expressed through frequency or intensity, first order coupling captures the existence of 
“special” relations.  Once this factor is computed for each member of the team, they are 
summed to create a measure of relations’ “specialness” for the team, whose joint efforts 
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are being evaluated.  The closer the scores are to 1.0 the more special the relations; the 
closer the scores are to 0, the more arms length.   
 
Univariate Analysis 
The first order network coupling variable centers around its mean of .122.  The data is 
reported for all 119 cases and includes three outliers having values of .6, 1.0 and 1.0.  The 
remaining scores range between .033 and .34.  The inclusion of the three values greater 
than .05 slightly skews the data to the right as indicated in Graph 3.8.  When all 122 
observations are included, the mean value of the first order coupling variable is .122.  If 








Graph 3.7 and Graph 3.8 provide graphical representation of the distribution of first order 
coupling scores.  In both graphs a parametric estimation of the distribution, kernel 





 Examining either the histogram or the kernel density estimation indicates the possibility 
of a bimodal distribution, with the mode for the majority of data points centered near a 
first order coupling value of .10 when outliers are removed, and .122 when all 122 
observations are included.   A second much smaller mode is centered near a value of .3, 
when outliers are excluded and .8 when they are included.   A Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normal distribution results in a W-test score of .4712, and a probability score of .0000, 
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indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the sample observations were drawn 
from a normally distributed population. 
 
The distribution of first order coupling factors also shapes the determination of how arms 
length and embedded relations are defined.  Uzzi suggests that “special” or embedded 
relations occur at the point where relations begin to be noticeably different from the 






Uzzi proposes taking a conservative look at the cumulative distribution and determining 
at what point the curvature of the line indicates that relations are beginning to look 
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different from the majority, or “special” (Uzzi 1996).  This approach to defining relations 
as either embedded or arms length operates on the premise that each set of relations 
between actors have a unique demarcation of specialness. The demarcation in New 
York’s fashion industry can differ from the demarcation in Georgia’s road and bridges 
industry.  
A conservative reading of the quartile plot shown Graph 3.10, with the three outliers 
omitted, indicates that 70-75% of first order coupling factors fall within the first quartile, 
which translates to first order coupling scores between .107-.125.  Because 70-75% of 
relations fall within in this range, a lack of “specialness” is indicated.  With this 
distinction, parameters are set to define arms- length transactions as those whose first 
order coupling scores fall at or below .125.   Relations, associated with first order 
coupling scores greater than .125, are defined as socially embedded relations. First order 
coupling scores, deeper into the second, third and fourth quartiles reflect “specialness” or 
embedded relations.  Using these definitions of arms length and embeddedness points out 
that the structure of the market between prime contractors and subcontractors is best 
described as competitive and arms length.  Additionally, these definitions split the sample 
set into thirty-two “special” or embedded transactions and ninety arms length 
transactions. 
The second social relations variable, PMPartners, captures influence on performance 
scores arising from relations between project managers.  This variable identifies whether 
there are prior relations between the firm project manager directing the project and the 
GDOT project manager who evaluates the quality of performance.  It is expected that 
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prior relations indicate greater intensity of relations between individuals and will be 




The second measure of embeddedness introduces a new operationalization of social 
relations into contracting studies. The variable project manager partners (PMPartners), 
is introduced to extend analysis to the individual level.  Where Uzzi and others (Baker 
1984; Baker 1990; Provan and Milward 1995; Uzzi 1996; Uzzi 1999; Provan and 
Milward 2001; Uzzi and Gillespie 2002; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003; Uzzi 2004; Rajdeep 
and J. 2007) conducted analyses at the organizational level, the variable indentifying 
relations between individuals allows examination of the impact of project manager dyads.  
This additional step will provide insight into whether the existence of prior relations 
between the GDOT project manager performing the evaluation and the private firm’s 
project manager for the performance being evaluated is associated with higher 
performance evaluation scores.   
 
Analysis of relations between individuals provides information distinct from 
organizational level analysis.  Measurement of relations at the organizational level reports 
summation of relations between multiple individuals, within multiple organizations.  
When such relations are viewed in the aggregate, any “specialness” of relations between 
individuals is lost.  Summing relations causes combined effects to be captured and 
individual distinction lost.  Including individual actor-to-actor relations in the model 
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allows recapturing of relations on the individual level.  As with the other social relations 
variable, we believe that the presence of existing ties between the project managers 
indicates the presence of trust, communication and the ability of actors to absorb benefits 
from social ties.  Again the ability to absorb benefits is a characteristic of strong ties.  We 
anticipate that prior relations between project managers will be associated with higher 
performance scores.  
 
The data  used to create the dichotomous variable for project manager to project manager 
relation, shows forty-nine percent of projects were staffed with  project managers dyads 
with neither prior nor concurrent relations.   The remaining fifty-one percent of projects 
had project manager dyads with established social relations. Using a dummy variable, 
dyads with established social relations are coded “1” for the PMPartners variable; all 
others are coded “0”.   
 
 Control Variables 
The control variables are drawn from both transaction costs and embeddedness theory. 
From transaction cost theory, we attempt to control for the impact of the firms’ capacity 
to control indirect costs. As relates to contract performance, transaction costs theory 
submits that contract performance is based on assigning work to the organization most 
capable of minimizing direct and indirect costs.  Recall, this proposition argues that 
performance is an outcome of an organization’s capacity to execute the contract without a 
great deal of search costs, bargaining costs or monitoring costs.  Properly specifying the 
model, then, requires a variable representing a firm’s capacity to address TCE the 
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concept that some organizations are better than others at controlling costs.  It requires a 
factor that controls for the firm’s capacity to being found, to be reasonable in contract 
negotiations and to not present excessive moral hazard.  To control for firm’s ability to be 
found, to negotiate reasonably and to control excessive opportunism the model uses the 
variable firm age as a proxy indicator.  Firm age is selected as a proxy indicator of  the 
firms capability in terms of TCE requirements because it indicates firm survival in the 
competitive marketplace; survival which necessitates the ability to control costs, to be 
found, to bargain reasonably and to present acceptable moral hazard. Including this 
variable parallels Uzzi’s usage of organization age in contracting as an indicator of an 
organization’s overall health and ability to effectively and efficiently use resources (Uzzi, 
1996 Franklin and Lee, 2007).   Again, following Uzzi (1996) we model Organization 
Age in linear and squared terms, indicating a curvilinear relationship between 
organization age and performance evaluation scores.   We expect performance scores to 
increase as age increases, up to a maximum point.  At some age, institutional routines are 
expected to set in, cutting off access to new information and new processes.  Once the 
firm reaches the age where institutional routines began to exert a negative influence, we 
expect the relationship between Organization Age and performance to become negative. 
 
Organizational age is defined as the evaluated firm’s organizational age at the evaluation 
date.  The majority of information on organizational age was obtained from the History 
or Profile section on each firm’s website. Where this information was not available on the 
website or was unclear because of business combination through either merger or 
acquisition, informal telephone interviews were conducted with firm personnel.  The 
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variable reports age as the difference between the year the firm was founded and the year 
of evaluation.  If the evaluated firm is the result of a merger or acquisition between U.S. 
firms, the age is computed as of the age of the older entity. If the firm is the result of a 
merger or acquisition between a U.S. firm and a foreign firm, the age is computed using 
the founding date of the U.S. firm. 
 
Graph 3.11  Organizational Age Histogram 
 
 
Organizational age is reported for all 122 observations.  As of the evaluation date, 
organizational age ranges from 4 to 121 years and is normally distributed around its mean 
of 50 years.  The mean is influenced by the inclusion of firms such as PBQD and URS, 
founded in 1885 and 1912 respectively, which appear multiple times in the dataset.  The 
W-test statistic of .87 and probability factor of .0000 indicate that given the sample size, 
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the null hypothesis of a normal distribution can be rejected.  A review of Graph 3.11 
indicates that the data is skewed towards higher ages, meaning there are more firms than 
expected which have existed more than fifty years. 
 
The second control variable addresses the influence of place on performance, and is also 
drawn from embeddedness theory. Geography operates on the premise “place matters.”    
Although embeddedness theory considers geography one of a multitude of environmental 
influences to consider, it is considered highly impactful in other theory.  For example in 
regional economics studies geographic location is argued to impact indicates a firm’s 
ability to access quality managerial talent, knowledge, financial capital, and tacit 
information, however in studies of social relations geography is recognized as an 
indicator of the impact local customs and mores have on performance.  The closer two 
actors are geographically, the better they communicate, and the more likely they are to 
absorb the benefits of social relations  (Piore and Sable 1984; Romer 1986; Romer 1994; 
Saxenian 1994; Malizia and Feser 1999; Cortright 2001; Florida 2002).   
 
Geography is operationalized as two dichotomous variables.  The first, gafirm, denotes 
whether the evaluated firm is headquartered in Georgia.  Firms with international or U.S. 
headquarters in Georgia are assigned a value of 1. All other headquarter locations are 
assigned a value of 0. The second geography variable, AtlantaFirm, zeros in on a firm 
location inside the counties surrounding the city of Atlanta.  The relationship between the 
geography variables and performance scores is expected to be positive, with Georgia 
based firms having higher performance scores than firms headquarted outside of Georgia. 
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In the sample data there are 11 observations of evaluated firms having headquarters 
within the state of Georgia, but outside of the Atlanta metropolitan area.  Additionally, 
there are 26 instances where the evaluated firm is headquarted within one of the counties 
surrounding the city of Atlanta. 
 
The final control variables are the categorical variables for each of GDOT’s twenty-four 
managers, who completed performance evaluations.  These variables are included to 
control for each evaluator’s personal tendencies in scoring and the related bias these 
tendencies introduce into the model.   
 
Table 3.7   Project Managers’ Scoring Tendencies 
Weighted Total 
Scores 








Sample Total 3.69 50 122 41 
Project Manager 15 3.23 1 10 10 
Project Manager 16 3.8 14 26 53.8 
 
The figures above (Table 3.7) illustrate the potential problem created by individual 
managers’ scoring tendencies.  The difference in scoring means between two project 
managers suggests that either Project Manager 16 gets more than a fair share of high 
performing firms and Project Manager 15 gets less than a fair share or they simply 





 Dot Distribution of Weighted Total Scores (Project Manager 16) 
 
Graph 3.12 uses a dot distribution of Weighted Total Scores awarded by Project Manager 
16 to show that this project manager tends to award scores that are higher than the sample 
mean. The distribution of Project Manager 16’s scores are centered on a mean of 3.8, 
which exceeds the sample mean of 3.69.  Overall, approximately fifty-four percent of 













In comparison, Project Manager 15 scores (Graph 3.13) are distributed around a mean of 
3.23, and only one of the ten evaluations recorded by this Project Manager was awarded a 
total weighted score of 4.0 or above.  Comparing the scoring tendencies of Project 
Manager 15 and Project Manager 16 shows that some of the variation in scores is created 
by fiat. Being assigned to Project Manager 16 is likely to result in above average scores, 
while being assigned to Project Manager 15 is likely to generate the opposite result.  The 
categorical variables for project managers are created to control for this potential bias. 
 
Sample Limitations 
The limitations that impact the study are those common to studies which rely on archival 
data. Specifically, the data were collected for internal reporting, not to facilitate external 
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research interests. The data were not collected and recorded with the intent of furthering 
ongoing interest in GDOT’s contracting process. Consequently, the observations do not 
fully capture the relationship between embedded relations between parties to OCD 
contracts and performance evaluation.  Studies examining performance from social ties 
are improved when the frequency and intensity of professional, political, social and 
religious interaction is fully captured.  The sample data captures only officially archived, 
professional interaction, and includes only data that federal and state regulations allow to 
be archived.  Such regulations prohibit GDOT from maintaining records on private firm 
employees, which were submitted as part of the award process.  These records would 
greatly enhance an embeddedness study because they detail the private firm employees’ 
educational and professional backgrounds and would allow other linkages between them 
and OCD project managers to be observed.    
 
In an effort to overcome this sample limitation, measures that provide indirect evidence 
of a given variable were introduced as allowed in social research (Singleton and Straits 
1999).  It is acknowledged that the embeddedness variables are not capturing the full 
extent of embedded relations between prime contractors, subcontractors and OCD, but 
they are providing formal evidence that the social relations exist. 
Finally, contracts included in the sample set differ on several dimensions, including 
duration, complexity and number of relations. Each of these characteristics offers 
interesting and valid approaches to assessing influences, which may affect how OCD 
managers evaluate performance.  Given the limited number of observations in the sample, 
all interesting approaches available through the data cannot be meaningfully explored in a 
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single study. This study uses the data to examine the impact of social relations on 
performance evaluation and foregoes the opportunity of understanding the role of factors 







MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
To explore answers to the research questions we use a multiple methodological approach.  
The foundation of the methodology relies on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model, which is then followed with analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 
The goal of the methodology is to create a process that allows testing or examination of 
the propositions laid out in the two research questions.  The first proposition proposes 
that the strength of tie between a prime contractor and its subcontractors will impact the 
quality of performance in a public contracting environment.  Specifically, I propose that 
strong ties between the two result in better performance. Along with this proposition, the 
methodology  intends to test the proposition that higher performance evaluation scores 
are awarded when a private firm’s project manager has established relations with the 
GDOT manager, evaluating his work. 
  
At the heart of this dissertation and methodology are two basic questions: When 
performance in public contracting is measured, are all important factors being considered 
and are performance factors being evaluated objectively?  To answer these questions, we 
turn to embeddedness theory that argues that traditional explanations of market based 
activity fail to properly account for the influence of social relations. This theory proposes 
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that important social influence is  not being considered. In other words explanations of 
market activity are undersocialized.   
 
 In contrast to approaches that rely on economic factors to explain market activity, 
embeddedness theory proposes that accurately modeled economic activity include 
indicators of social influence. It follows then that just as explanations of market activity 
are undersocialized, explanations of performance outcomes are similarly undersocialized 
and likewise should include analysis of influence from the social structure. 
 
I follow an embeddedness theory line of argument and present an ordinary least squares 
regression model of performance as an outcome of social relations and organizational 
factors. This model is derived from earlier studies of the impact of social relations on 
outcomes from market activity (Uzzi, 1996) 
 
Similar to Uzzi’s model (1996), my model includes variables designed to capture the 
influence of social relations on performance. The model, however, differs from Uzzi in 
that Uzzi used logit models and dichotomous dependent variables.  Uzzi was interested in 
an either/or proposition.  Uzzi focused on knowing whether the strength of social ties 
between prime contractors and their subcontractors was associated with a firm either 
staying in business or closing. I selected an ordinary least squares regression model rather 
than an ordered logit model because  the dependent variable is a continuous, ranging 
between 0 and 5.  This approach is fairly straightforward, easily understandable and can 
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be used without creating distortion.    The OLS model specified below is used to test the 
previously stated hypotheses :  
 
Embeddedness Model  
Y= b0+b1x1+b2x2+b3x3+b4x4…b28x28+∂1+∂2+∂3 
Where 
Y=  Weighted Total Performance Score 
x1=  Organization Age 
x2=  Organization Age Squared 
x3=  Georgia Firm 
x4= Atlanta Firm 
x5…x29  24 GDOT evaluators 
∂1=  First Order Network Coupling Score 
∂2=  First Order Network Coupling Score Squared 
∂3=  Project Manager Dyad 
 
The model returned the following regression results, which provide the first 
indicator of whether there is any usefulness in considering social relations as 





Table 4.1  Regression Results  
 
Observations F- test Probability 
F-test 
R2 Adj R2 Degrees of 
Freedom 
Root MSE 
119 4.10 .0000 .5366 .4056 26 .4459 
 
Based on 119 observations and 26 degrees of freedom, the F-test returned a factor of 4.10 
with a probability of .0000. The F-test gives an initial report of whether the model has 
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any explanatory value.  The results do not offer explicit comment on any specific 
variable, but the p-value of .0000 does indicate that at least one of the variables in the 
model is useful in explaining some portion of the variation in the dependent variable.   
 
The model’s R-square of .5366 indicates that nearly 54% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained through the predictor variables.  The power of the model 
is increased by the inclusion of categorical variables that control for the individual 
scoring tendencies of each GDOT evaluator. The large number of predictor variables, 
created by the addition this categorical variable, relative to the number of sample 
observations does boost the model’s explanatory power, however when the power of the 
model is adjusted to moderate the influence of the large number of predictor variables, an 
adjusted R-squared value of .4056 is returned.  Whether the adjusted r-square or base r-
square is considered, the model shows it has power to predict the impact of social 
relations on performance evaluations.  
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The full model returns the following results: 
 
Table 4.2     Model Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P>|t| 95% CI 
PMPartners    .2621009    .1083396      2.42    0.018      .0469292 - .4772727 
1st Order 
Coupling 
-1.925601    1.072819     -1.79    0.076     -4.056313   .2051103 
(!st Order 
Coupling)2 
1.874751    1.093563      1.71    0.090     -.2971586   4.046661 
Organization 
Age 




   2.45e-06    .0000318 0.08     0.939     -.0000608   .0000657 
Georgia Firm   -.2456358    .1933673     -1.27     0.207       -.62968    .1384084 
Atlanta Firm -.1261727    .1302952     -0.97    0.335     -.3849502   .1326048 
      
      
 
 
The relationship between individual factors and performance scores are explained below 
 
The Social Relations Variables  
First Order Coupling 
 The purpose of considering the first order coupling variable is to provide insight into the 
impact of embedded ties on performance measures. The first step  is to define them in the 
data. To do that, we examine how different tie strengths are distributed within the data. 
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The goal is to identify a point of bifurcation where ties can be allocated to one of two 
groups. One group will define the typical tie found among relations between prime 
contractors and their subcontractors; the second group will identify “special” or 
embedded strong ties.  
 
The identification of strong ties relies on Uzzi’s (1996) proposal that strong ties are those 
that can be characterized as being “special” or different. In the study of the garment 
industry Uzzi (1996) proposed a means of identifying “specialness” in relationships. Uzzi 
proposed that “special” relations are outlier relations; relations that fall outside the range 
where the majority of relations can be located.  In the garment industry study, 
“specialness was observed when the strength of tie between manufacturers and 
contractors reached the .20-.25 range.    
Graph 4.1 
 
To identify “specialness” in our data, we place the data in quartiles and examine the 
distribution of tie strength among  the quartiles.  Graph 4.1 shows the quartiles and 
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indicates that 73 percent of all ties between prime contractors and their subs fall in the 
first quartile (see horizontal axis).  Another 17 percent fall in the second quartile and the 
remaining 10 percent are found in the third and fourth quartiles.  This breakdown shows 
that only 10 percent of the relations between GDOT prime contractors and their 
subcontractors is made up of socially embedded “special” relations, the strong ties we are 
interested in understanding. The majority of transactions between prime contractors and 
their subcontractors are better characterized as arms length transactions. Prime 
contractors are not concentrating work among  preferred groups of subcontractors and 
forming strong tie strengths. Instead, GDOT’s prime contractors are spreading work 
among many different subcontractors, and engaging in arms length relations.  
 
 Given that only 10 percent of the social relations between GDOT prime contractors and 
their subcontractors have the specialness to qualify as embedded or strong ties, it follows 
that the relationship between tie strength between prime contractors and their 
subcontractors and performance is not statistically significant at the .05 probability level. 
We hypothesized that we would see stronger ties associated with better performance.  
That hypothesis, however, is not supported by the regression results.    
 
  A review of a quadratic prediction graph plotting the first order coupling variables 
against performance scores helps to explain the relationship between tie strength and 
performance. In the model I allow for a curvilinear relationship between tie strength and 
performance scores.  I include a linear and a squared term for the coupling or tie strength 
variable. This treatment of the relationship between tie strength between prime and 
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subcontractors allows for  directional change in the relationship between the strength of 
tie between prime contractors and their subcontractors and contract performance.  It 
assumes, as Uzzi (1996) discovered that the relationship is not linear. As a result of this 
treatment, the regression results for the tie strength, first order coupling, variables are 
interpreted using a quadratic formula, rather than explained in terms of how a one unit 
change in the independent variable impacts the dependent variable. Instead of 
understanding how a change in the coefficient on the tie strength variable changes the 
performance score, the coefficients on the tie strength variables are used to find the point 
at which the direction of the relationship between tie strength and performance scores 
changes.  
Substituting the coefficients of the linear and squared terms into the quadratic formula  
(–b/2b2)   
Where: 
-b = 1.9256; the opposite of the coefficient on the linear term 
2b2= 2(1.874751) the coefficient on the squared term 
We find the direction of the relationship changes at the curve’s minimum point of 











 Initially, as the strength of tie between a prime contractor and its subcontractors 
increases, the performance score decreases. The trend is estimated to continue until the 
tie strength reaches a value of .51 and the associated performance score falls below 3.2.  
At this point, the nature of the relationship is predicted to change. As prime contractors  
limit work to fewer subcontractors and increase the tie strength, their performance scores 
rise. 
 
The graphical estimation of the relationship between contractor relations and 
performance scores indicates that prime contractors are equally successful in receiving 
high performance scores when they maintain either strong or weak ties with their 
subcontractors. Ties that cannot be characterized as either weak or strong are typically 
not associated with high performance scores.   
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The actual observations confirm the graphical estimation. The sample’s top quartile of tie 
strength is composed of 13 cases of ties greater than or equal to .20, the tie strength Uzzi 
(1996) uses to indicate the presences of  strong ties. These 13 cases represent 10.7%  of 
sample observations. The sample’s top quartile of performance scores is composed of 
twenty-eight cases where performance scores are greater than 4.0. Of the twenty- eight 
cases in the top quartile of performance scores, four are associated with strong ties.  
These four strong tie observations represent 14% of high performance scores. While 
strong ties account for only 10.7% of all observations, they represent 14% of all high 
performance score observations. This indicates that strong ties are overrepresented in the 
sample’s top quartile of performance scores. Another way to evaluate the impact of 
strong ties is to say that of the thirteen observations, 31% were associated with 
performance scores higher than 4.0. The small number of observations of strong ties do 
not allow for statistical  inference of the impact  strong ties have on performance, 
however both the graphical estimation and regression results suggest the quality of 
performance in public contracting is higher when  strong ties between a prime contractor 
and its subcontractors exists. 
  
PMPartners 
In the sample, prior relations between a private firm project manager and its GDOT 
evaluator influenced performance scores. The relationship is positive and statistically 
significant.  Performance scores on projects where the two project managers have worked 
together previously are expected to be .26 points higher than performance scores where 
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the two project managers have not worked together previously, when all other factors are 
held constant.  In terms of magnitude, the coefficient .26 on PMPartners indicates that the 
relationship between prior relations and performance scores is weak but the p-value of 
.018 for the sample data indicates that this relation is highly significant and is expected to 
be found consistently in the population. 
The contrast between the variable’s high statistical significance and low impact on 
performance scores may be isolated to the public sector, because of demands for clear 
boundaries between official behavior and social relations.  GDOT evaluators may 
consciously work to limit the influence social relations have on performance evaluation.  
The small coefficient on the relationship suggests that the extent of the influence is 
moderate and tempered from delivering an even greater advantage. The influence might 
be constrained by rules and regulations governing GDOT officials.  
GDOT employees operate under an umbrella of federal prohibitions, restrictions and 
requirements detailed in the Federal Procurement Integrity Act (1998) which discourages 
officials employed in agencies receiving federal funds from allowing personal relations to 
influence any aspect of the procurement process. Violations of the federal restrictions can 
result in civil and criminals charges against offending employees. The federal 
disincentives are supported by disincentives specific to Georgia officials. The Georgia 
Code of Ethics calls for refraining from any behavior which might create the appearance 
that official conduct or ability to protect the public interest has been unduly influenced 





The control variable, organization age, is not statistically significant in the sample. 
Similar to the tie strength variables, the organizational age variables’ construction follows 
Uzzi(1996) and are designed to allow for directional changes in its impact on 
performance scores. The negligible coefficients on both the linear and squared terms 
indicate that the length of time the prime contractor has existed bears no influence on 
performance.  Organization Age was conceptualized  a proxy indicator for TCE claims 
that the ability to control direct and indirect costs defines successful contract 
performance. If this variable is a good conceptualization of that concept, the regression 
results indicate that when contract performance is defined in terms that are not financial 






The variable is included in its linear and squared terms to model a curvilinear 
relationship.  The scatterplot above indicates that if the relationship between Organization 




When all other factors are held constant, firms headquartered in Atlanta or the State of 
Georgia have no advantage over firms that are located farther away from GDOT offices.   
Having a headquarters close to GDOT does not result in helpful tacit information being 
passed between prime contractors and GDOT officials.  There is no indication that the 
benefits of sharing local customs and mores that are found in studies of private firms are 
present between GDOT officials and private firm project managers.  
 
Evaluator Scoring Tendencies 
 
The final control variables are the categorical variables for each GDOT Manager who 
completed a performance evaluation in the sample.   Interpreted individually, the 
variables allow comparison of how each GDOT project manager scores in relation to the 
control manager, whose scores are omitted from the regression.  The control manager’s 
scores are the basis at which all other scoring tendencies are held constant.  
The results indicate that only three project managers’ scoring tendencies were statistically 
different than the control project manager (see Table 4.4). The coefficients on the 
categorical variables for Project Manager 3 (1.3504), Project Manager 18 (1.1244) and 
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Project Manager 19 (1.1182) show that on average their projects are rated one point 
higher than the control managers. Although statistically significant, the three scoring 
tendency differences can only be interpreted as three GDOT managers typically award 
points higher than the one specific manager whose scores served as the control.   
 
Analyzing this variable by breaking it down into a level for each GDOT project manager 
gives information on the tendencies of scorers, however, it is important to remember that 
the model incorporates the GDOT project manager variable as one variable divided into 
twenty-four levels, however only when all twenty-four levels are combined is the full 
variable presented (UCLA: Academic Technology Services 2012).  Understanding the 
relationship between the full variable and the dependent variable, requires understanding 
how the variable operates when all of its parts are combined.  Stata allows testing of the 
impact of this variable by testing all of the levels combined.  Testing in this manner 
yielded an F-statistic of 4.71 and a P-value of .0000, which indicates that in the 
population of OCD performance evaluation scores, there is great likelihood that a 
relationship exists between who is giving the performance scores and the performance 
score awarded .  In other words, the performance measurement is not completely 
objective, and in some sense is dependent on which project manager is doing the 
measuring. 
 
To understand the impact of  “ who is giving the score”  on the total weighted score, we 
first determine if GDOT project managers are participating equally in the performance 
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measurement process.  In the sample data, five managers account for approximately 68% 
of all evaluations (See Table below) 
Table 4.3 
Most Frequent Evaluators in Measurement Process 
 
Evaluator Identifier Year of First 
Evaluation 
% of Total 
Evaluations In the 
Sample 
Cumulative 
7 2005 13.93 13.93 
13 2002 14.75 28.68 
15 2005 8.20 36.88 
16 2003 21.30 58.18 
20 2005 9.84 68.02 
 
The impact of this group of managers can also be seen in their predominance when the 
role of prior relations between a firm project manager and a GDOT project manager is 
considered.  In the sample, fifty of the observations where prior relations between project 
managers occurred, involved one of these five GDOT project managers.  This accounts 
for approximately 82% of such occurrences, although these five represent only 21% of 
the total number of GDOT managers submitting performance evaluations.  These five 
managers are in a position to exert a disproportionate amount of influence on 
performance measurement in the Office of Consultant Design.   An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) provides insight into how this group’s influence impacts performance 
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Results from the regression indicate that performance scores are influenced by the 
absence or presence of prior relations between the GDOT evaluator and the private firm 
project manager whose work is being evaluated.  
 
A review of the observations in the sample shows that evaluations by five GDOT 
managers (The  Five) are overrepresented in the sample. Because of this 
overrepresentation, it is important to understand the impact these five are having on the 
sample data.  Specifically, we need to understand if these five managers rate performance 
in a manner similar to their peers. I use an ANOVA to analyze how performance scores 
awarded by the five overrepresented GDOT managers compare to those awarded by their 
peers.  A one way ANOVA provides a means of determining if the means of two 
different groups are the same.   
 
I created an ANOVA to divide GDOT project managers into two different groups based 
on their frequency of submitting performance evaluations.  The first group consisted of 
The Five and the second group was composed of all other evaluators.  The first ANOVA 
analysis measured whether there was a difference in the mean of total weighted score, the 
dependent variable, based on whether the evaluator was a frequent participant in the 
evaluation process.  As presented in the table below, between the two groups with one 
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degree of freedom, the analysis returned an F-statistic of 11.78 and a p-value of .0008.  
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of equal means between the two groups must 
be rejected. There is a statistically significant difference between the scores given by The  
Five and their peers. 
 
ANOVA Weighted Performance Scores (by Frequency Group) 
                        Analysis of Variance 
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Between groups      3.57530597      1   3.57530597     11.78     0.0008 
 Within groups      36.4225838    120   .303521532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Total           39.9978898    121   .330561073 
 




A review of mean performance scores confirms this finding.  The mean score awarded by 
The Five was 3.58, compared to a mean of 3.94 for all other evaluators.  Firms that are 
not evaluated by one of the five frequent evaluators, on average, will receive higher 
performance scores than those firms evaluated by one of The Five.  
The table below provides a closer view of The Five’s scoring tendencies and shows that 
even among The Five, scoring tendencies vary. Being evaluated by GDOT managers, 7, 
13, or 15 would likely result in scores lower than the mean but being evaluated by GDOT 
manager 16 or 20 would lead to higher scores. Even when they evaluate the same private 
firm project manager the scoring tendencies remain. Both GDOT manager 7 and 16 
evaluated the same project manager from the firm HNBT. The mean score given this 
manager from manager 7 was 3.35, compared to a 3.9 rating by manager16. The results 
were similar for a manager from Kimley-Horn, who received mean scores of 3.6 and 4.0 




Top Five Scorers 
GDOT 
Manager 
# Evaluations Mean Score Min Max 
7 17 3.45 2.85 4.00 
13 18 3.33 2.45 4.35 
15 10 3.23 2.40 4.00 
16 26 3.80 3.00 4.00 




The second ANOVA was designed to allow additional analysis into the relationship 
between prior relations between project managers and performance scores.  Recall, the 
regression delivered two  inferences about the impact prior relations have on performance 
scores to explore further.  On one hand the highly significant .018 p-value indicates that 
the observed positive relationship between prior relations and higher performance scores 
are an accurate representation of what would be found in the population. At the same 
time, the small coefficient on the variable indicated that the relationship is not very 
strong.  From the results, we can infer that prior relations between the GDOT evaluator 
and the private firm manager whose work is being evaluated lead to higher performance 
scores. At the same time, we can infer that the impact this relationship has on 
performance scores, though positive, is minimal.   
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The second ANOVA takes the prior relations variable used in the regression analysis and 
compares means between performance scores awarded when a prior relation exists and 
when one does not. The two groups created are those with prior relations and those 
without prior relations. The results of the analysis indicate no statistical difference in the 
mean performance score awarded by the two groups.  The analysis returned an F-statistic 
of 2.01 and a p-value of .1594, meaning the null hypothesis that the two groups will have 
the same mean cannot be rejected. The relationship exists but its impact on performance 
scores is so minimal that it is difficult to capture. This result supports the regression 
finding of a relationship between prior relations and performance scores that exists but 
has little bearing on the performance score awarded.   See results in the table below. 
 
ANOVA of Total Weighted Performance Scores (based on Prior Relations) 
                        Analysis of Variance 
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Between groups      .665298828      1   .665298828      2.01     0.1594 
 Within groups      38.8143655    117   .331746713 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Total           39.4796643    118   .334573426 
 
 
A third ANOVA analyzed what happens at the intersection of frequent evaluators and 
prior relations. This ANOVA tested the null hypothesis that frequent evaluators and 
nonfrequent evaluators participate equally in having prior relations with the private firm 
managers they evaluate.  The results of this analysis, however, indicate that the two 
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groups do not have the same rate of participation in prior relations with their private firm 
peers.   As the table below shows, the ANOVA returned an F-statistic of 13.54 with a p-
value of .0004, indicating the two groups do not have the same mean of participation in 
prior relations with evaluated peers. This is also evident by counting the sample 
observations.  In the sample observations 49% of all cases were between parties with no 
prior relations however, 62% of observations involving The Five were between parties 
with prior relations. The Five GDOT managers are more likely to have repeated 
evaluations of their private firm peers than the other GDOT evaluators. 
 
ANOVA of Equal Participation in Prior Relations (by Frequency Group) 
                        Analysis of Variance 
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Between groups      3.08365654      1   3.08365654     13.54     0.0004 
 Within groups      26.6474359    117   .227755862 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Total           29.7310924    118    .25195841 
 




From the three ANOVAs we determine that The Five evaluators give lower performance 
evaluation scores, and they are more likely to have prior relations with the private firm 
manager they are evaluating. We also see that the impact of prior relations on 
performance scores exists but is minimal that and hard to detect in an ANOVA.  I did not 
expect to see the relationship between prior relations and performance scores behaving in 
this manner. Instead, I expected to see the benefits of better communication and trust 
associated with higher performance scores.  
 
A possible explanation for the negligible impact of prior relations on performance scores 
is that the low scoring tendency of The Five is somehow interacting with the relationship 
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between prior relations and performance scores and suppressing the impact of that 
relationship.  
 To understand if the low scoring tendency of The Five was interferring with the impact 
of prior relations on performance scores, I used a two way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine if an interactive relationship existed.  I divided GDOT evaluators 
into two frequency groups: The Five high frequency evaluators and all others. Likewise I 
divided all cases into two prior relations groups: existing and not existing, I ran a 




ANOVA Test For Interaction Between Variables 
 
                  Source |  Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F 
      -------------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Model |  6.22165806     3  2.07388602       7.17     0.0002 
                         | 
                 BigFive |  5.49715535     1  5.49715535      19.01     0.0000 
              PMPartners |  2.81508071     1  2.81508071       9.73     0.0023 
      BigFive*PMPartners |  .611592998     1  .611592998       2.11     0.1486 
                         | 
                Residual |  33.2580062   115  .289200054    
      -------------------+---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Total |  39.4796643   118  .334573426    
 
 
Examination of p-values in  the twoway ANOVA results table above  again shows that 
the means of performance scores for The Five evaluators and all other evaluators 
(pvalue=.0000) are not the same and the mean of performance scores differs depending 
on the existence of prior relations (p-value=.0023).  Of primary interest, the results also 
show the impact of the interaction term.  The interaction term BigFive*PMPartners  
identifies that there is interaction between The Five and the effect prior relations has on 
performance scores. The .1486 p-value on the interaction term indicates that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that these two variables are not interacting with each other and 
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changing the effect on performance scores. The results indicate that the scoring 
tendencies of The Five frequent GDOT evaluators is impacting the effect of the prior 
relations variable on performance scores.  Given that The Five award lower performance 
scores, it is reasonable that their tendency is suppressing the positive impact of prior 
relations on performance scores. 
 
Summary of Analysis 
The sample data were analyzed using multiple techniques including ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and twoway analysis 
of variance (ANOVA).  Regression results presented no statistically significant support 
for the hypothesis that strong ties between prime and subcontractors lead to better 
performance. In part this finding is due to the small number of strong ties found in the 
sample data. Results do indicate, however, that where strong ties did exist they were 
more likely to be associated with performance scores greater than 4.0. 
 
 Regression results did confirm the second hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
performance scores and prior relations between GDOT project managers and the private 
firm project manager whose work was being evaluated.  The results indicate that there is 
high reliability that this relationship will be observed in the population of engineering 
design contracts managed by OCD.  The results also indicate that the magnitude of this 
relationship is weak.  The relationship between performance scores and prior relations 
between project managers was examined further using analysis of variance. 
 
Of particular note, the ANOVA indicated that performance scores are impacted by the 
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scoring tendencies of the GDOT manager. The impact is seen in the ANOVA finding of 
lower scoring mean by managers who are frequent evaluators compared to GDOT 
managers who are not frequent evaluators. The impact is further evident in the finding 
that the effect of prior relations on performance scores is changed based on whether the 
scorer is one of The Five frequent scorers.  
 
The ANOVAs brought to light the impact of the five frequent evaluators’ influence. Their 
influence did not come through clearly in the regression results because their impact was 
controlled for by a categorical variable. This variable was designed to capture the 
individual impact of each evaluator and did not capture the impact of any grouping of 
evaluators. By combining the five frequent evaluators together in an ANOVA, their 
collective impact became clear and was shown to influence the mean performance score 
and to exert influence on the relationship between prior relations and performance scores.  
Understanding that the regression was capturing, but not reporting, the impact of a group 
of frequent evaluators’ scoring tendencies helps explain how a model with small 
coefficients on key variables appears to be a very fit model and a good predictor of 










Fitness of the Model 
The model’s fitness is tested to assure that the difference between the model’s predicted 
values and actual values is random, and is random and unpredictable at all values of 
performance scores. With this assurance we can be comfortable that our predictors are 
good at explaining the relationship between our predictor variables and performance 
scores and that any unexplained error is a result of uncontrollable  chaos.  A visible 
representation of the error terms provides a good way of quickly understanding if  the 








Initial validation of the model’s fitness is obtained by visually scanning the plot of  
residuals versus the fitted values (Graph 4.4). The plot showing the residuals associated 
with predicted values indicates that at all values of predicted performance scores, the 
residuals vary within plus or minus one point. At every point the predicted value can be 
either higher or lower than the actual the performance score. For example, the cluster of 
fitted values between performance scores of 3.5 and 4.0 show residuals randomly 
scattered above and below the zero mark. The error term fluctuates in both directions. 
The model is as likely to overestimate the performance score as it is to underestimate the 
performance score. There is no indication that the direction or absolute value of residuals 
change based on the predicted value of performance score.  
The fitness of the model is further confirmed in a visual of regression residual versus the 
normal distribution.   




A qnorm plot of the residuals (Graph 4.4) provides additional visual indication of the 
model’s fitness.  The graph of residual versus a normal distribution shows that the 
distribution of residuals very closely mirrors a normal distribution.  The normal 
distribution expected of residual is plotted on the solid line with the models returned 
residuals represented by individual dots.  The comparison of the model’s residuals to a 
normal distribution of residuals shows residuals from the model to reflect the stochastic 
noise found in a normal distribution 
 
Tests for Homoskedasticity 
 
Homoskedasticity is the first test of fitness.  The test determines if the standard deviations 
of the residuals are related to the value of the variables.  The Cook-Weisberg test is used 
to test whether the error variances are consistent across all values of performance score or 
change according to the value of the dependent variable.  In other words, it informs if the 
model’s predictive ability is consistent across all levels of performance score or is better 
at predicting a particular range of values in the dependent variable. The chi-square value 
.38, coupled with the large significance value .5397, indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the error variances are equal across all values of Y.  This indicates 






Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of wghttotal 
         chi2(1)      =     0.38 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5397 
 
Test for Multicollinearity 
The model was also tested for multicollinearity between predictor variables.   As 
expected there is high correlation in the variables presented in quadratic terms.  No other 
variables showed high levels of correlations. 
 
Table 4.5  Correlations between Variables 
          | wghtto~l  storder storde~q   OrgAge OrgAgesq   gafirm Atlant~m 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
   wghttotal |   1.0000  
     storder |  -0.1584   1.0000  
   stordersq |  -0.0801   0.9446   1.0000  
      OrgAge |   0.0295  -0.1353  -0.1567   1.0000  
    OrgAgesq |   0.0466  -0.0816  -0.0995   0.9437   1.0000  
      gafirm |  -0.0016   0.0433  -0.0208  -0.2505  -0.1920   1.0000  
 AtlantaFirm |  -0.0958   0.2704   0.2595  -0.3492  -0.2974  -0.1638   1.0000  
 
 
Variance Inflation Factor 
The variance inflation factor, VIF provides an indicator of the level of intercorrelation 
between predictor variables.  As expected VIF scores from the model’s predictor 
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variables indicate high levels of correlation between the linear and squared terms of the 
variables included in quadratic form and low levels for other variables.   Higher VIF were 
also recorded for four of the categorical variables representing GDOT project managers.  
None of the results of the VIF analysis suggest a level of multicollinearity that should be 
of undermine the model’s effectiveness. 
 
Summary of Model Fitness 
In summary the model, as tested, clears tests for multicollinearity between predictor 
variables, significant influence from outliers in the sample data, normal distribution of 
residuals and ability to predict values at any given value of Y. It is sufficiently specified 
expected to provide a reliable and valid representation of the relationship between 














Table 4.6 Regression Results for Project Manager Categorical Variable 
 
 gdotpm_code1 |  (dropped) 
gdotpm_code2 |    .973525   .5641086     1.73   0.088    -.1468435    2.093893 
gdotpm_code3 |   1.350443   .6551749     2.06   0.042     .0492089    2.651677 
gdotpm_code4 |   .2439883   .6533456     0.37   0.710    -1.053612    1.541589 
gdotpm_code5 |   -.309199   .6804316    -0.45   0.651    -1.660595    1.042197 
gdotpm_code6 |    .594972   .5814146     1.02   0.309    -.5597677    1.749712 
gdotpm_code7 |   -.078681   .4775792    -0.16   0.870    -1.027195    .8698325 
gdotpm_code8 |  -.3148278   .6535441    -0.48   0.631    -1.612823    .9831672 
gdotpm_code9 |   .4936585   .5019636     0.98   0.328    -.5032845    1.490602 
gdotpm_co~10 |   .0550539   .5356708     0.10   0.918    -1.008835    1.118942 
gdotpm_co~11 |  -.2838303   .4662491    -0.61   0.544    -1.209841    .6421807 
gdotpm_co~12 |  -.3804391   .4857065    -0.78   0.435    -1.345094    .5842158 
gdotpm_co~13 |   .2479009   .4695507     0.53   0.599    -.6846674    1.180469 
gdotpm_co~14 |   .4283333   .6639409     0.65   0.520    -.8903106    1.746977 
gdotpm_co~15 |   .2901189   .5048616     0.57   0.567    -.7125798    1.292818 
gdotpm_co~16 |   .2142079   .5810879     0.37   0.713    -.9398828    1.368299 
gdotpm_co~17 |   .2600158     .47705     0.55   0.587    -.6874467    1.207478 
gdotpm_co~18 |   1.124351   .5008458     2.24   0.027     .1296286    2.119074 
gdotpm_co~19 |   1.118179   .5651514     1.98   0.051    -.0042607    2.240618 
gdotpm_co~20 |   .1081176   .5362195     0.20   0.841    -.9568606    1.173096 

















Problem Review   
Public contracting is a policy targeted towards improving government performance by 
improving its efficiency and effectiveness. As public policy, a contracting strategy is 
intended to improve performance by having government agencies execute activities they 
are uniquely suited to execute and to contract out all others. This strategy of improving 
government performance through increased effectiveness and efficiency helped shape 
how theorists defined which factors would be included in performance scores. As a result 
public managers and policy scientists frequently rely on effectiveness and efficiency 
propositions when deciding how to measure government performance.  
 
A key critique of this approach, however, claims that efficiency and effectiveness 
approaches such as TCE offer an incomplete understanding of public contracting and 
consequently will misstate the factors that drive successful outcomes and should be 
included in performance measurements.  In particular, critics often claim that TCE and 
doesn’t consider the impact social relations have on performance and ultimately 
performance scores.  
 
 129 
Critics point out that the factors that are identified as being key to determining outcomes 
from economic behavior are often undersocialized.  If it is true that theories focused on 
economic efficiency and effectiveness do not adequately express the connection between 
outcomes from economic activity and social influences, then there is an associated 
problem of having performance measurement processes that do not capture the influence 
of social factors either.   To address the omission of recognizing the impact of social 
influences on performance and performance measurement critics present a theory based 
on observation, where they assert they have observed social influences impacting 
economic performance. 
 
This claim by sociologists and legal theorists, if correct, creates a problem in theory and 
in practice. If social factors influence contracting performance they must be accounted 
for in the measurement and scoring process, otherwise problems will result from omitting 





The goal of the research was to determine if evidence existed that public contracting 
performance measurement was impacted by social influences. I narrowed the broad 
definition of social influence to relations between parties involved in GDOT contracting.  
I constructed two social relations variables.  Using the Uzzi model (1996), I designed the 
first variable to capture the influence that ties between prime contractors and their 
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subcontractors have on performance scores assigned by GDOT project managers. I 
analyzed contract and performance evaluation data to determine if strong ties between 
prime contractors and their subcontractors resulted in higher performance scores. I also 
used the data to construct the second social relations variable.  This variable was 
designed to determine if the scores GDOT managers awarded were influenced by prior 
relations between the GDOT project manager and the private firm peer whose work was 
being evaluated. 
 
A review of the sample data shows that prime contractors primarily use networks of weak 
ties to execute GDOT contracts.  Of 122 observations, eleven showed enough frequency 
of relations between a prime contractor and its subcontractors to be considered a 
“special” relationship.  All other observations showed prime contractors spreading work 
among many subcontractors and not concentrating work among a few subcontractors.  
This overwhelming prevalence of weak ties was also reflected in the regression results. 
Because the variable measuring tie strength lacked enough variation, the regression 
returned results that found no statistically significant relationship between performance 
and strength of tie between a prime contractor and its subcontractors.  High performance 
scores were found when prime contractors used a weak tie strategy and also when they 
used a strong tie strategy.  I plotted the relationship between tie strength and performance 
score that the regression model predicted, the resulting graph showed a curvilinear 
relationship between the two factors.  In some observations high performance scores 
were predicted to be associated with weak ties and in other cases predicted to be 
associated with strong ties. There appears to be an intervening variable that influences 
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which tie strength is associated with higher performance scores. This suggests that 
embeddedness theory rightly claims that environmental factors help determine whether 
strong ties or weak ties result in better outcomes.  
 
The findings confirm that prior social relations between public and private firm project 
managers leads to higher performance scores. The regression results indicate that these 
prior relations have a positive and statistically significant impact on performance scores. 
The results support propositions that when prior relations exists, private firm project 
managers understand that maintaining social standing within the contracting community 
and receiving loyalty from GDOT evaluators requires high performance on projects.  
There is a desire to meet community standards and improved communication and trust 
between the project managers. The relationship is performing as hypothesized the higher 
scores result from the parties’ absorbing the benefits from trust based relations.  
 
Although the model results support a hypothesis that prior relations are associated with 
higher performance scores, there is evidence that the amount of impact is influenced by 
individual scorer tendencies. In the sample there is an overrepresentation of evaluations 
from five GDOT managers, three of them have mean scores lower than the other 
evaluators’ mean score and two have mean scores higher than the 3.69 sample mean.  
These five managers also have a greater incidence of prior relations with the private firm 
peer, whose work is being evaluated.  With two of the frequent scorers the relationship 
between prior relations and higher performance scores is as hypothesized, but this is not 
true with the other three frequent scorers.  The instances where performance scores are 
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not responding to prior social relations suggest the possibility that either environmental 
influences or personal scoring tendencies are changing the affect of prior relations on 
performance scores. 
 
Results from the study also provide some evidence that not all GDOT project managers 
are participating equally in the measurement process. I found that five GDOT project 
managers were responsible for 68% of all the evaluations in the sample data.  This rate of 
participation causes concern because it signals that there are other managers who are not 
participating at an equivalent rate. A review of the observations indicated that these five 
managers were no more senior than their GDOT peers and the type of contracts they 
evaluated did not appear to be very different, in length or description, from those 
evaluated by the other GDOT project managers.  This finding raises a concern because 
employees and managers tend not to participate in the performance measurement process 
when they feel they have not had adequate input in the performance scoring or 
measurement design (Behn, 1995).   
 
Analysis of the data also indicated that the performance scores given by GDOT managers 
is focused more on the process of executing the contract than the quality of the final 
goods or services delivered.   The performance scoring system assigns 30% of total value 
to how well contractors cooperate with GDOT, elected officials, federal agencies, and 
other stakeholders.  It assigns another 25% of total value to how well the prime contractor 
manages its subcontractors and assigns only 10% of total value to the overall quality of 
the good or service delivered. This scoring system is one that raises the questions, “what 
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are we really trying to accomplish” and “ is this system telling us if we met the policy 
goals?”  Based on what is being measured and the value assigned to each factor, one 
might surmise that the policy goal associated with GDOT’s public contracting is to 
contract out work to firms that work well with GDOT and do not require GDOT 
managers to supervise subcontractors. 
 
Discussion 
Propositions from multiple theories were combined to shape the research logic model. 
Although performance measurement, transaction cost economics and embeddedness 
theories are distinctly different approaches, they share a common goal of identifying the 
factors that significantly influence performance. Each made an individual contribution 
that helped shape the logic model and in return, the findings contribute to each of them 
individually.  
 
To review the impact of my findings, I created a discussion section for each theory.  I 
first address performance measurement theory and present my theoretical contribution 
based on the research results.  In the same section, I add the related policy implications.  
This format is used to address my contribution to embeddedness and transaction cost 









Performance measurement theory is consistent in saying that a first step in a good process 
is identifying the factors that lead to goal attainment. The factors are expected to vary 
from organization to organization. Whether the factor is economic, political or social is 
not important. For a factor to be included as a part of performance measurement, it is 
only important that the factor exerts significant influence on performance.  The results of 
this study provide evidence that social relations impact public contracting performance 
scores and should be included in future discussions of performance measurement theory. 
Although public administrators frequently rely on theories that direct attention to 
improving performance scores by managing changes in resources, regulation, 
organization or management, managing social relations can also lead to improved 
performance scores. This research shows that vendors can use social relations as an 
avenue for improving public contracting performance scores.  Building relationships 
between public managers and their private firm peers can establish mutual trust and 
commitment  and will contribute to higher performance scores.  
 
A second step in performance measurement calls for measuring factors objectively and 
without bias. While reasonable, this goal is problematic.  In the analysis I found scorer 
tendency seeping into measurements. It was impacting performance measurement in two 
ways. First, scorer tendency was effecting whether the score was above or below the 
mean. Firms evaluated by Manager 7, 13 or 15 were more likely to receive scores below 
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the mean than were firms evaluated by other managers.  This trend held even when 
Managers 7, 13 or 15  evaluated private firm managers who were also evaluated by other 
GDOT managers. Along with its direct influence on scores, scorer tendency was also 
shown to interact with the prior relations variable and change its affect on performance 
scores. The tendency of a manager to give a low score decreases the positive affect prior 
relations had on performance scores. This influence results in a measurement that reflects 
some combination of actual performance and scorer tendency as opposed to representing 
only the quality of the actual performance. In this sense the influence of scorer tendency 
violates the performance measurement requirement that calls for objective and unbiased 
measurement. If this tenet is violated, it decreases the value of indentifying all the 
important influences and undermines performance measurement goals. So, while there is 
great energy around identifying influencing factors and finding the correct measures to 
inform citizens, elected officials and public managers about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government, there needs to be energy around ensuring that what they 
receive is an accurate assessment of performance. 
 
Policy Implications 
The association of better performance scores with social relations between a public 
manager and the private sector peer being evaluated may have little impact on public 
managers’ decision making. They might find the idea of exploring these relations with 
vendors problematic, fearing the discovery of  vendor opportunism and goal 
incongruence that are sometimes found in principal-agent relationships. Similarly, public 
managers might be hesitant to explore this avenue if their perceptions are shaped by fears 
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of agency capture. Although there is evidence of principal-agent and agency capture 
problems to consider, the benefits of knowing how social relations with vendors impact 
performance scores should also be considered.  Network and embeddedness theories 
provide a bit of comfort to public managers when they point out that firms might avoid 
using these relations opportunistically because to do so would mean they would risk 
losing access to network resources, including participation on GDOT contracts.   
 
With regard to the impact of scorer tendency, policy makers should first note that there is 
no single, universally superior solution to measurement problems (Behn, 1995). With that 
understanding public managers need to focus on ferreting out how much of performance 
scores is a reflection of scorer tendency versus an accurate depiction of quality because 
the part of the score which is scorer tendency adds little that is meaningful for decision-
making and understanding if a policy is moving toward goal attainment.  Instead, the 
influence of scorer tendency is a distortion that needs a filter to minimize its impact.  
 
GDOT has the option of tackling this issue by restructuring the evaluations process. A 
revised process would have the pool of evaluators reviewed and their tendencies noted.  
This might be no more than an annual review of the overall average scores awarded and a 
report of where each project manager’s average is in relation to the group mean.  A step 
further would be to develop a scoring distribution system that restricts performance 
scores to a normal distribution, unless specific reasons for non-normal distribution are 
documented. These recommendations will not eliminate the influence of scorer tendency 
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on performance evaluations, but they can help minimize the threat it presents to a fair and 
objective evaluation process. 
GDOT should also work to understand why five managers are contributing much to the 
measurement process, while other contribute less.  This pattern might be a result of work 
allocation but it could also signal a lack of buy-in by some managers.  If there is a lack of 
buy-in, there needs to be analysis and discussion of why some managers choose not to 
participate in the process.  Managers may opt not to support GDOT’s performance 
measurement process because of they had little input into its design. They might have 
little buy-in because they do not see the connection between what is being measured and 





 Embeddedness theory makes much of the impact of social relations. It offers the 
proposition that no economic activity is immune to influences from the social structure in 
which it is embedded.  This can be extended to include the evaluation of economic 
performance. The theory further proposes that social relations can be viewed as either 
strong ties or weak ties.  Strong ties improve outcome by increasing trust and 
communication between parties. Weak ties improve outcome by increasing the number of 
sources of information and the amount of accessible resources. The strength of the tie 
reflects the frequency and intensity of interaction.  Strong ties are the result of either very 
frequent interaction or very intense interaction. Weak ties require the opposite. 
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 The two tie strength have several distinguishing characteristics, but one of the most 
important is also one of the least seldom mentioned.  That is, weak ties occur frequently 
and strong ties don’t. Forming strong ties requires much greater physical, emotional and 
mental effort than weak ties.  Consequently as reflected in the sample data, weak ties will 
be plentiful and strong ties will be few.  In the sample observations, we observed that 
prime contractors overwhelming relied on weak ties to execute contracts.  The naturally 
occurring composition of social ties favors weak ties. They are prevalent because they are 
easy to accumulate, easy to maintain and they deliver results. Relying on weak ties with 
subcontractors did not negatively impact the prime contractor’s performance scores.   
 
Strong ties were also associated with high performance scores, but in much fewer 
numbers. There is a boundedness around forming strong ties because they require  
frequency and intensity of interaction. Organizations and individuals are limited in the 
time and intensity they can expend in building social relations, therefore they are also 
limited in the number of strong ties they can form and maintain.  The implication of  
results showing both tie strengths  associated with high performance scores is that it is 
time to shift the conversation. Rather than worry whether prime contractors should build 
a network of weak or strong ties, the focus can shift to allowing ties to grow organically 








Understanding that strong ties between prime contractors and subcontractors are not 
required to reach high contract performance scores and that they occur infrequently 
presents interesting policy opportunities for the State of Georgia.  In general, potential 
exists for public contracting programs to be an integral part of Georgia’s larger economic 
development efforts. For example, the 2012 state budget allocated $1.9 billion for the 
Department of Transportation (Kemp and State 2011). The magnitude of resources 
dedicated to transportation projects makes GDOT a potentially formidable economic 
engine for the state. GDOT can help marginalized communities access economic 
opportunity by encouraging prime contractors to include them in their network of 
subcontractors. Adding these weak ties to the prime’s network will not negatively impact 
performance scores.  This opens opportunities for GDOT to play an important role in 
how the State develops economically. But doing so requires that the State of Georgia take 
a broader view of GDOT’s ability to influence regional economic development.  Along 
with recognizing that GDOT’s ability to build and maintain a transportation system is 
invaluable to economic development, elected officials can also recognize the potential of 
using transportation dollars to stimulate growth in distressed regions by grafting them 
into existing contractor networks. 
 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
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Theoretical Contribution 
Unlike embeddedness theory, transaction cost economics is keen on presenting public 
contracting performance as a function of how the transaction is governed.  TCE does 
allow that, on occasion, it is necessary to engage in incomplete contracting. In such 
circumstances, social relations between parties become important. Otherwise, the 
attention needs to stay on the specified dimensions of the transaction.   
 
In analysis of the relations between GDOT prime contractors and their subcontractors, 
there was no statistically significant evidence that GDOT evaluators recognized improved 
performance based on the type of social relations between a prime contractor and its 
subcontractors. This finding differs from Uzzi’s findings that the nature of social ties 
influenced firm survival rates and price paid for legal services (1996, 2004).  In the Uzzi 
cases, however, benefits and performance improvement was tracked between the two 
parties involved in the social tie.  Uzzi analyses determined that at least one party to the 
tie recognized and acknowledged a benefit from the tie.  This analysis in contrast, sought 
to understand if performance scores from a third party recognized and acknowledged 
benefits from the tie between two other actors.  
 
 In retrospect, I proposed a transitive relationship between prime contractors, 
subcontractors and GDOT.  I proposed that if a prime contractor received benefits from 
ties with its subcontractors, I would be able to track those benefits to performance scores 
on GDOT contracts. In this approach, there was an unaddressed assumption of 
transitivity.  This went beyond Uzzi’s proposal (1996), where Uzzi only proposed that 
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one of the parties to the relation would have an improved outcome.  With my research 
design, I mistakenly attempted to use GDOT evaluations to identify if the prime 
contractor received benefits from its relations with subcontractors. 
 
Even so, I was able to see that embeddedness theory is correct in its proposition that 
environmental influences will determine whether strong or weak ties will impact 
performance scores. TCE proposes that environmental uncertainty such as the entry or 
exit of competition or supply chain disruption should be considered in the make or buy 
decison. Embeddedness theory, on the other hand, proposes that environmental 
influences such as industry type or where the industry is in its life cycle will determine 
which strength of tie will lead to higher performance scores. I found evidence of an 
intervening variable that influenced the impact of weak ties in some cases and strong ties 
in other cases.  This also supports the argument that TCE is not explaining all the factors 




The analysis that examined if social relations between the project managers impacted 
performance measurement showed that higher scores occur when project managers have 
worked together previously. This relationship provides statistically significant evidence 






There is enough evidence to suggest that public managers need to expand the number of 
factors they consider when public contracting is used to improve government 
effectiveness and efficiency. It may be important to get transactions assigned to the 
correct governance structure, but the process improvement doesn’t stop there. When 
contracting in an environment of highly educated people with a rare set of skills, public 


















Weaknesses and Future Research 
 
There are a number of interesting avenues for future research.  For example future work 
can identify whether social relations have the same impact on performance scores in less 
technical and specialized functions. Is there something different that occurs when public 
agency engineers and architects work with their private firm peers that does not happen 
when a public agency contract specialist works with a peer at a social services 
organization? Future research should work to deliver tools that capture more relations and 
more impact of all known relations. I used contracts and evaluation reports as evidence of 
formal social relations. There is much more evidence of social relations that I was unable 
to capture because federal and state privacy protection require that all contractor resumes 
be destroyed after a contract has been awarded. There is a possibility that many of the 
engineers are alumni of the same engineering programs or belong to the same 
professional and industry groups. Having this evidence of social relations would provide 
additional evidence of the impact of social relations on performance scores.  
 
Although the goal of this research was not to discuss the impact of evaluator tendencies, 
it became clear that this is a factor in performance measurement.  It has a direct impact on 
scores and an indirect impact.  Scorer tendency changes the affect that other variables 
have on performance scores.  Additional research needs to explain the impact of this 
factor and offer solutions for offsetting it. In highly technical environments, there are few 
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people who have the skills to evaluate performance. Therefore the quality of future 
decisions rests with their ability to deliver objective measurement.  
 
Finally I mentioned that the research was designed such that it attempted to use GDOT 
evaluations to capture the impact of social relations between prime contractors and their 
subcontractors. I made the assumption that the impact of tie strength would be visible in a 
third party’s evaluation process.  For a number of previously stated reasons the research 
was unable to observe that impact, with statistically significant results. I would like to see 
a different research design take another shot at examining whether strength of ties 












(1998). Federal Acquisition Regulations System. 48. U. S. D. o. Justice, U.S. 
Government Printing Office via GPO Access. 48 CFR 3.104-1-11. 
Adnan, L., C. Z. M. Jamil, et al. (2012). "Ethical Antecedents of Dysfunctional Behavior 
in Performance Measurement and Control System." Asian Social Science 9(1): 
29-38. 
Agranoff, R. and M. McGuire (2001). "Big Questions in Public Network Management 
Research." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11(3): 295-326. 
Atterton, J. (2007). "The 'Strength of Weak Ties' : Social Networking by Business 
Owners in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland." Sociologia Ruralis 47(3): 228-
245. 
Baker, W. E. (1984). "The Social Structure of a National  Securities  Market." American 
Journal of Sociology 89: 775-811. 
Baker, W. E. (1990). "Market Networks and Corporate Behavior." American Journal of 
Sociology 96: 589-625. 
Behn, R. D. (1995). "The Big Questions of Public Management " Public Administration 
Review 55(4): 313-324. 
Behn, R. D. (2003). "Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different 
Measures." Public  Administration Review 63(5): 586-606. 
Bennett, J. and E. Iossa (2006). "Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of 
Public Services." Review of Industrial Organization 29(1-2): 75-92. 
Boyne, G. A. (1998). "Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service 
Contracting in U.S. Local Government." Public Administration Review 58(6): 
474-484. 
Boyne, G. A. (1998). "The determinants of Varations in Local Service Contracting- 
Garbage In, Garbage Out?" Urban Affairs Review 34(1): 150-163. 
Brown, M., A. Falk, et al. (2004). "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market 
Interactions." Economectrica 72(3): 747-780. 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2003). "Contract-Management Capacity in Municipal and 
County Governments." Public Administration Review 63(2): 153-164. 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2003). "Managing Contract Performance: A Transaction 
Costs Approach." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22(2): 275-297. 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2003). "Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations 
for Government Service Production Decisions." Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 13(4): 441-468. 
 146 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2004). "Assessing the Management Costs of Delivering 
Services Under Alternative Institutional Arrangements." Journal of Public 
Procurement 4(3): 375-396. 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2004). "Managing the Public Service Market." Public 
Administration Review 64(6): 656-668. 
Brown, T. L. and M. Potoski (2006). "Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning 
Values, Institutions, and Markets." Public Administration Review 66(3): 323-332. 
Brudney, J. L., S. Fernandez, et al. (2005). "Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out: 
Patterns Among the American States." Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 15(3): 393-419. 
Burghardt, J. and P. Schochet (2001). National job corps study: Impacts by center 
characteristics. Princeton, NJ, Mathematica Policy Research. 
Burt, R. S. (1983). Network Data from Archival Records. Applied Network Analysis. R. 
S. Burt and M. Minor. Beverly Hills, CA, London, New Delhi, SAGE 
Publications. 
Burt, R. S. (1983). Range. Applied Network Analysis. R. S. Burt and M. Minor. Beverly 
Hills, CA, London, New Delhi, SAGE Publications. 
Burt, R. S. (1983). "The Stability of American Markets." American Journal of Sociology 
94: 356-395. 
Burt, R. S. (1987). "Social Contagion and Innovation." American Journal of Sociology 
92: 1287-1335. 
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
Coase, R. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." Economica November(4): 386-405. 
Cooper, P. J. (2003). Governing by Contract: Challenges and Opportunnities for Public 
Managers. Washington, DC, CQ Press, A Division of Congressional Quarterly 
Inc. 
Cortright, J. (2001). New Growth Theory, Technology and Learning: A Practioner's 
Guide; Reviews of Economic Development Literature and Practice No. 4. 
Washington, U.S. Economic Development Administration. 
Davis, L. E. and D. C. North (1971). Institutional Change and American Economic 
Growth. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Degenne, A. and F. Michael (19991). Introducing Social Networks. London, SAGE 
Publications. 
Domberger, S. and D. Hensher (1993). "On the Performance of Competitively Tendered, 
Public-Sector Cleaning Contracts." Public Administration 71(3): 441-454. 
Domberger, S. and P. Jensen (1997). "Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, 
Evidence, Prospects." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13(4): 67-78. 
Doornik, K. (2006). "How Relational are Construction Contracts." Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy 15(2): 517-548. 
Elango, B. and C. Pattnaik (2007). "Building Capabilities for International Operations 
Through Networks: A Study of Indian Firms." Journal of International Business 
Studies 38(4): 541-555. 
Elfring, T. and T. Hulsink (2003). "Networks in Entrepreneurship: The Case of High-
Tehnology Firms'." Small Business Economics 21: 409-422. 
 147 
Elfring, T. and T. Hulsink (2007). "Networking by Entrepreneurs: Patterns of Tie 
Formation in Emerging Organizations." Organization Studies 28(12). 
Ethics, G. C. o. (1982). Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 45-10-1. S. o. Georgia, 
Office of Personnel. 
Etzioni, A. (1988). The Moral Dimension. New York, Free Press. 
Faulkner, R. and A. B. Anderson (1987). "Short-Term Projects and Emergent Careers: 
Evidence From Hollywood." American Journal of Sociology 92: 879-909. 
Florida, R. (2002). The Rise of the Creative Class" And How It's Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life. New York, Basic Books. 
Galaskiewicz, J. (1985). "Interorganizational Relations." American Sociological Review 
11: 281-304. 
Galaskiewicz, J. (2007). "Has a Network Theory of Organizational Behaviour Lived Up 
to its Promises." Management and Organization Review 3(1): 1-18. 
Granovetter, M. (1973). "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." 
Sociological Theory 1: 201-233. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510. 
Hatry, H. P. (1999). "Mini-Symposium on Intergovernmental Comparative Performance 
Data." Public  Administration Review 59(2): 101-104. 
Hefetz, A. and M. Warner (2004). "Privatization and its Revers: Explaining the 
Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process." Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 14(2): 171-190. 
Heinrich, C. J. (2007). "Evidence-Based Policy and Performance Management: 
Challenges and Prospects in Two Parallel Movements." The American Review of 
Public Administration 37: 255-277. 
Heinrich, C. J. (2012). "How Credible Is the Evidence, and Does It Matter? An Analysis 
of the program Asssessment Rating Tool." Public  Administration Review 71(1): 
123-134. 
Hodge, G. A. (1998). "Contracting Public Sector Services: A Meta-analytic Perspective 
of the International Evidence." Australian Journal of Public Administration 57(4): 
98-110. 
Hodge, G. A. (2000). Privatization: An International Review of Performance. Boulder, 
CO, Westview Press. 
Human, S. E. (2000). "Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral 
Networks:  A Comparative Study of Success and Demise." Administrative 
Science Quaterly 45: 327-365. 
Isett, K. R. and K. Provan (2005). "The Evolution of Dyadic Interorganizational 
Relationships in a Network of Publicly Funded Nonprofit  Agencies." Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 15(1): 149-165. 




Kerckhoff, A., K. Back, et al. (1965). "Sociometric Patterns in Hysterical Contagion." 
Sociometry 28(March): 2-15. 
 148 
Kettl, D. F. (1993). Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution. 
Klein, P. G. (1998). "New Institutional Economics." from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=115811 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.115811. 
Kravchuk, R. S. and R. W. Schack (1996). "Designing Effective Performance 
Measurement Systems under the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993." Public  Administration Review 56(4): 348-58. 
Krippner, G., M. Granovetter, et al. (2004). "Polanyi Symposium: A Conversation on 
Embeddedness." Socio-Economic Review 2(1): 109-135. 
Lane, J. E. (2001). "From Long-term to Short-term Contracting." Public Administration 
79(1): 29-47. 
MacNeil, I. R. (1974). "The Many Futures of Contracts." Southern California Law 
Review 47: 691-816. 
MacNeil, I. R. (1985). "Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing 
Relationships: Relational Contract; What We Do and Do Not Know." Wisconsin 
Law Review 483(May/June). 
MacNeil, I. R. (2000). "Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries." 
Northwestern University Lae Review 94(3): 877-907. 
Malizia, E. E. and E. J. Feser (1999). Understanding Local Economic Development. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, Center for Urban Policy Research. 
Markovsky, B., D. Willer, et al. (1988). "Power Relations in Exchange Networks." 
American Sociological Review 53(2): 220-236. 
Martin, L. L. (2005). "Performance-based Contracting for Human Services: Does it 
Wort?" Adminstration in Social Work 29(1): 63-77. 
McFayden, M. A. and A. A. Cannella Jr. (2004). "Social capital and knowledge creation: 
Diminishing Returns of the Number and Strength of Exchange Relationships." 
Academy of Management Journal 47(5): 735-746. 
McGowan, R. P. and T. H. Poister (1985). "The Impact of Productivity Measurement 
Systmes on Municipal Performance." Policy Studies Review 4(3): 532-540. 
Milward, H. B. (1995). "A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network 
Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health 
Systems." Administrative Science Quarterly 40: 1-33. 
Milward, H. B. and P. K.G> (1998). "Measuring Network Structure." Public 
Administration 76(Summer): 387-407. 
Milward, H. B. and K. G. Provan (1998). "Principles for Controlling Agents: the Political 
Economy of Network Structure." Journal of  Public Administration Research and 
Theory 8(2): 203-221. 
Milward, H. B. and K. G. Provan (2000). "Governing the Hollow State." Journal of  
Public Administration Research and Theory 10(2): 359-379. 
Milward, H. B. and K. G. Provan (2001). "Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for 
Evaluating Public Sector Organizational Networks." Public Administration 
Review 61(4): 414-423. 
Milward, H. B. and K. G. Provan (2003). "Managing The Hollow State." Public 
Management Review 5(1): 1-18. 
 149 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1996). "What do interlocks do?  An Anlaysis, Critique, and Assessment 
of Research on Interlocking directorates." Annual Review of Sociology 22: 271-
298. 
Moe, T. (1990). The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public 
Bureaucracy. Organization Theory. O. E. Williamson. New York, Oxford: 116-
153. 
Morley, E. (1983). Using Productivity Improvement as a Managerial Strategy During a 
Period of Retrenchment. Annual Conference, American Society for Public 
Administration. New York. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. (1991). "Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1): 97-112. 
Palumbo, D. J. (1987). Politics and Evaluation. Newbury Park, CA, SAGE. 
Panet, P. D. and M. J. Trebilcock (1998). "Contracting Out Social Services." Canadian 
Pubic Administration-Administration Publique du Canada 41(1): 21-50. 
Perry-Smith, J. E. (2003). "The Social Side of Creativity: A Static and Dynamic Social 
Network Perspective." Academy of Management Review 28(1): 89-106. 
Piore, M. and C. Sable (1984). The Second Industrial Divide. New York, Basic Books. 
Poister, T. H. (1999). "Performance Measurement in Municipal Government:  Assessing 
the State of the Practice." Public Administration Review 59(4): 325-335. 
Poister, T. H. (2003). Measuring Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Poister, T. H., J. C. McDavid, et al. (1979). Applied Program Evaluation in Local 
Government. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books. 
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. New York, Holt, Rinehart. 
Polanyi, K. (1945). Origins of Our Time: The Great Transformation. London, Gollancz. 
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time. Boston, Beacon Press. 
Porter, M. (1990). Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, Free Press. 
Prager, J. (1994). "Contracting Out Government Services- Lessons rom the Private 
Sector." Public Administration Review 54(2): 176-184. 
Provan, K. and A. Fish (2007). "Interorganizational Networks at the Network Level:  A 
Review of the Empirical Literature on Whole Networks." Journal of Management 
33(3): 479-516. 
Provan, K. and H. B. Milward (1995). "A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational 
Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health 
Systems." Administrative Science Quaterly 40(1): 1-33. 
Provan, K. and H. B. Milward (2001). "Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for 
Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks." Public Administration 
Review 61(4): 414-423. 
Provan, K., M. Vezaie, et al. (2005). "The Use of Network Analysis to Strengthen 
Community Partnerships." Public Administration Review 65(5): 603-612. 
Rahman, M. and M. Kumaraswamu (2004). "Contracting Relationship Trends and 
Transitions." Journal of Management in Engineering 20(2): 147-161. 
Rahman, M. and M. Kumaraswamu (2007). "Building a Relational Contracting Culture 
and Integrated Teams." Canadian Journal of Civil Enginering 34(1): 75-88. 
 150 
Rajdeep, G. and S. R. J. (2007). "Embeddedness of Organizational Capabilities." 
Decision Sciences 38(3): 451-488. 
Rangan, R., R. Samii, et al. (2006). "Constructive Partnerships: When Alliances Between 
Private Firms and Public Actors Can Enable Creative Strategies." Academy of 
Management Review 31(3): 738-751. 
Ridley, C. E. and H. A. Simon (1938). "The Criterion of Efficiency." Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science: 20-25. 
Rodriguez-Pose, A. and M. Storper (2006). "Better rules or stronger communities? On 
the social foundations of institutional change and its economic effects." Economic 
Geography 82(1): 1-25. 
Rogers, E. (1962). Diffusion of Innovations. New York, Free Press. 
Romer, P. (1986). "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth." Journal of Political 
Economy 94(5): 1002-37. 
Romer, P. (1994). "The Origins of Endogenous Growth." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 8(1). 
Romzek, B. S. and J. M. Johnston (1999). "Contracting and Accountability in State 
Medicaid Reform: Rhetoric, Theories and Reality." Public Administration Review 
59(5): 383-399. 
Romzek, B. S. and J. M. Johnston (1999). "Reforming Medicaid through Contracting" 
The Nexus of Implementation and Organizational Culture." Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 9(1): 107-140. 
Romzek, B. S. and J. M. Johnston (2000). Reforming State Social Services through 
Contracting: Linking Implementation and Organization Culture. Washington, 
D.C., Georgetown University Press. 
Romzek, B. S. and J. M. Johnston (2002). "Effective Contract Implementation and 
Management: A Preliminary Model." Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 12(3): 423-453. 
Romzek, B. S. and J. M. Johnston (2005). "State Social Services Contracting: Exploring 
the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability." Public Administration 
Review 65(4): 436-449. 
Rubenstein, R., A. E. Schwarfz, et al. (2003). "Better Than Raw: A Guide to Measuring 
Organizational Performance with Adjusted Performance Measures." Public 
Administration Review 63(5): 607-615. 
Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. Cambridge, MA, Harvard Uinversity Press. 
Scherer, F. M. (1980). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Sclar, E. (2000). You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of 
Privatization. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. 
Scott, A. (1986). "Industrial Organization and location" division of laor, the firm and 
spatial process." Economic Geography 63: 215-231. 
Simpson, B. and T. McGrimmon (2008). "Trust and embedded markets : A multi-method 
investigation of consumer transactions." Social Networks 30: 1-15. 
Singleton, R. A. and B. C. Straits (1999). Approaches to Social Research. Oxford Oxford 
University Press. 
 151 
Smith, S. R. (1996). "Transforming Pubic Services: Contracting for Sjocial and Health 
Services in the U.S." Public Administration 74(1): 113-127. 
Tiwana, A. (2008). "Do  Bridging Ties Complement Strong Ties? An empiricl 
examination of allianc ambidexterity." Strategic Management Journal 29(3): 251-
272. 
UCLA: Academic Technology Services, S. C. G. (2012). from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/dummy.htm. 
Uzzi, B. (1996). "The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect." American Sociological 
Review 61(4): 674-698. 
Uzzi, B. (1999). "Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social 
Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing." American 
Sociological Review 64(4): 481-404. 
Uzzi, B. (2004). "Embeddedness and Price Formation in the Corporate Law Market." 
American Sociological Review 69: 319-344. 
Uzzi, B. and Gillespie (2002). "Knowledge Spillover in Corporate Financing Networks:  
Embeddedness and the Firm's Debt Performance." Strategic Management Journal 
23: 595-618. 
Uzzi, B. and R. Lancaster (2003). "Relational Embeddedness and Learning:  The Case of 
Bank Loan Managers and Their Clients." Management Sciece 49: 383-99. 
Van Slyke, D. (2003). "The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social 
Services." Public Administration Review 63(3): 296-315. 
Van Slyke, D. M. (2003). "The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social 
Services." Public Administration Review 63(3): 296-315. 
Wang, X. (2010). Performance Analysis. Boston, Jones and Bartlett. 
Wasserman, S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Weible, C. (2007). Notes From September 13 -Bobby Meeting. 
Wholey, J. S. and H. P. Hatry (1992). "The Case for Performing Monitoring." Public  
Administration Review 52(6): 604-10. 
Wholey, J. S. and K. E. Newcomer (1997). Clarifying Goals, Reporting Results. Using 
Performance Measurement to Improve Public and Nonprofit Programs, New 
Directions for Evaluation 75. San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass: 91-98. 
Willamson, O. E. (1999 ). "Public and Private Bureaucracies:  A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective." The Organization Journal of Law Economics $ 15(1): 
306-347. 
Willamson, O. E. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead." Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII(September 2000): 595-613. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, The Free 
Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1998). "Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works: Where it is 










Wanda Wall Spivey 
 
 
Ms. Spivey was born in Rockingham, North Carolina.  She received a B.S. in 
Accounting  from Florida A&M University, Tallahassee, Florida  and a Masters in 
Business Administration. in Marketing and Entrpreneurial Studies from The Wharton 
School at The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Prior to 
matriculating  to Georgia Tech to pursue a doctorate in Public Policy, Spivey worked as a 
marketing executive with The Procter and Gamble Company, The Pillsbury Company 
and National Car Rental.  Additionally, Spivey earned national honors from the U.S. 
Minority Business Development Agency as Director of the Minneapolis/St.Paul Minority 
Development Center.  When not working on her research, Ms. Spivey enjoys life, travel, 
and a range of outdoor activities. 
 
 
 
